SECURITY AS A DETERMINING FACTOR OF QUALITY OF LIFE IN A STATE FROM AN INSECURE REGIONAL AREA

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ABSTRACT

THIS ARTICLE AIMS TO PRESENT THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING QUALITY OF LIFE AT A HIGH STANDARD, NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH MORE, IF THE STATE IS IN AN AREA OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. WILL WE FOCUS ON INSECURITY OBSERVATION OF THE BLACK SEA, AND AS A CASE STUDY WE WILL CONSIDER ROMANIA. THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA TO RUSSIA, BUT ALSO CONFLICTS BETWEEN PRO-RUSSIAN AND PRO-OCCDIENTALI IN UKRAINE LED TO A STRONG REGIONAL CENTRE PLAN UNCERTAINTY. BUT THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF A STATE IT MUST BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING A FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE CITIZENS.

KEYWORDS: CRIMEA, ROMANIA, RUSSIA, SECURITY, INSECURITY, GEOPOLITICAL

INTRODUCTION

Area regional insecurity generated amid the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the fighting in Ukraine, we decided to debate this controversial topic: the quality of life of a State in the close vicinity of a conflict. But considering disputes between Russia and the US on various coordinated over time the trend has been observed their expansion, and maintenance, spheres of influence.

Amid the divisions in Ukraine, on the oscillation state - in the sphere of Russian influence in the Western - it was possible to generate an epicenter of insecurity in the close vicinity of Romania. Russia, in an excess of power, and amid miming democratic principles annexed the Crimean peninsula, actually pull away from its neighbor. The reasons given by the Kremlin leader had the wish of the majority population of the peninsula: Crimean residents wanted to be in Russia[1]

The question that arises after Vladimir Putin's statements, is as follows: why now? By that time people did not want annexation to Russia? If we think that in the peninsula, Russia holds an important maritime fleet, we understand that this annexation was actually at stake. Appealing to the work of the historian Gheorghe Bratianu, Black Sea issue, we observe that, geostrategically, who owns the Crimean Peninsula, across the great masters.

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In this study we will focus attention on the concept of quality of life in terms of population. We will try to highlight negative aspects felt at the individual level of uncertainty found in the Black Sea region and in other regions of the close proximity of our state. Catalin Zamfir assumes that this concept is one of evaluative[2] and "is the result of living conditions and reporting activity that make up human life, needs, values and human aspirations."[3] We can see that embedded conditions objective nature (creation of human life), but especially subjective - starting from the idea that each individual is evaluator of his life. However, we will treat the issue of quality of life in terms of individual security.

Research methodology is multidisciplinary nature. In order to achieve this article, I called and rigorous critical examination of the scarce bibliography, failed to notice the differences and similarities between the information available at this time. Causality method allowed us to outline a framework of cause and effect disputes in Ukraine. Thus, according to Bloch's March[4], it must offer an answer that ?, questions regarding the insecurity in the close vicinity of Romania and NATO, but also question how ?, aiming at the possibility of continuing high quality of life in our state, in particular, but also in a state that borders a zone of conflict in general.

I. CONFLICTS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY OF ROMANIA



Map1[5]

The recent events that took place in Ukraine not a single case of conflict in neighboring Romania, but over the past two decades, some regions have experienced various forms of conflict. The five previous conflicts shown on the map are known for different reasons, but we find a common denominator to them: Russia. Following the map, we see five areas of conflict, either held or frozen:

Transnistria immediately after antitotalitarian revolutions of 1989, within the Soviet bloc, became breakaway region, this being possible due to the active involvement of Russia. On this occasion, on 2 September 1990, Transnistria was proclaimed Dniester Moldavian Republic. On 21 July 1992, the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation signed an agreement that target peaceful settlement of the conflict in this area. But even after the actions of a military

aggression, Russia has shown a relentless commitment to support the separatist regime by providing political support, but also economic.

Outbreaks of conflict in the Caucasus region have escalated various reasons. For example, the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh was regarded by the international community as an *internal conflict*. As a result, world powers have shown no desire to get involved in that area, so that Russia could expand dominance in the area.[6]

If **Abkhazian-Georgian issue**, Russia was, and still is, a major player in terms of influencing the execution policy. "During the conflict in 1992 - 1993, under an unclear political situation in the Russian leadership as Russian forces stationed in Abkhazia, Abkhaz forces were supported directly against Georgians; After Georgians have requested further support from Russia, Abkhazia was isolated and Russian troops were imposed in the peacekeeping forces. Since 2004, when new political leadership of Georgia has expressed a desire to get closer to NATO and the EU, Russia changed the same score moving to support open Abkhazia ".[7]

West, when these conflicts, showed a weak response, something that led to a continuation of the Russian policy of regional interference. Thus, in March 2014 it was the culmination in which Russia annexed the Crimea as a result of disputes between Russian speakers and Ukrainian pro-Westerners - the reasons and possible consequences discussed below.

II. THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA TO RUSSIA



map2[8]

Ukrainian crisis of particular significance for geostrategic area it was in Romania. At the moment we can not talk about a post-crisis period, but only to ask when it will end. Russia

annexing the Crimea in March 2014 showed a serious violation of international treaties, sounding the alarm about the fact that the area of influence does not want to be His split.

Why Ukraine? It is a natural question that requires a well argued response. First, Ukraine, before downgrading the crisis, tried a change of spheres of influence, heading toward the European Union and to NATO, something unthinkable for Russia. "It is worth mentioning that, in principle, Russia has objected to the development of relations with former Soviet states EU, but watched as their defiance of NATO integration options, seeing in this a threat to security."[9] Indeed, Russian security from a military perspective, if a state has suffered in its vicinity becomes a NATO member. As a neighboring country, Ukraine is a buffer zone between the North Atlantic Treaty and the Russian Federation. Secondly, Russia, through its project in May 2014 on the Customs Union, hopes to attract more of what states have been under the influence of the Soviet bloc. This concerns a counterweight to the European Union. Specifically, it aims to create a common economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific stretch.

The beginning of the crisis may trigger two points: 1) November 21, 2013 represents the beginning of popular protests pro-European[10] as a result of unexpected gesture of President Yanukovych to suspend the association agreement with the European Union; or 2) February 22, 2014 as representing Yanukovych's flight from Kiev. On this occasion, the pro-Western forces come to power with the support euromaidan community.

Why Crimea? With this question we will try to understand how important the Crimea to Russia, and why it could not enter into the Western sphere of influence. George widower in his hybrid war or conflict perverse geopolitical geometry?, an analysis very pertinent case law south of Ukraine, indicating the determining factors that led to Moscow's aggressive decision to snatch the Crimea from its neighbor. We can assume, first of all, that Russian leader Vladimir Putin wished the tough measures it has taken to draw a signal about the fact that Russia is still a powerful force in the world. Let us not forget how many times President Putin said in the past two years, the state that leads him represents a significant nuclear force.

Before continuing our analysis, we want to emphasize that Russia's Crimean Peninsula belonged until 1954, when Khrushchev gave Ukraine. Basically, attaching lightning that put it at about Russia, following a referendum, it is such a territorial *adjustment*, without much economic significance, but with an increased geostrategic and geopolitical importance. "Russia could not admit that lost the Crimea, the Black Sea fleet base or regions of eastern Ukraine, industrialized. Of course, a priority for Russia as a great power still anchored some strategic corridors was | Feedback | Crimea "[11]. The maritime base in Sevastopol, the Russian Federation has control, without any doubt, the whole sea.

Why continuing disputes in Ukraine? We consider that tensions in Ukraine had as a catalyst willingness to move closer to the European Union. In this case, Moscow has considered inadmissible to be reduced sphere of influence, acting proposals to deal Yanukovych President's decision to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. The consequences are known and do not consider it necessary to revisit them in this article. But if Russia wanted Ukraine to join halting EU and Crimea recovery, what makes it continue hostilities in the neighboring state? Even with all the Russian leader, Ukraine signed on June 27, 2014 Association Agreement with the European Union and the Crimea was recovered. The objective was achieved half, but still battles may have taken a different connotation. Starting from this premise must take into account that on 21 May 2015, the Ukrainian parliament has suspended military cooperation with the

Russian Federation, and the result is reflected in the fact that Soviet troops stationed in Transnistria, is not transited through Ukraine. In this situation situations may take various forms: 1) Moscow can no longer feed the troops because of the lack of transit corridors in Ukraine, so that Moldova may reopen fire; 2) The possibility reignite armed conflict in Transnistria, that Moscow's solution in order forcing Ukraine to reverse the decision - by forcing the post of EU intervention of a conciliator; 3) The increased hostilities in Ukraine following the decision of the Ukrainian parliament. Considering Russia's actions in the recent past, we can state that all the above scenarios are plausible.

III. PUBLIC PERCEPTION ON STATUS IN (THE) SECURITY

The state has proven throughout history that citizens can not ensure complete security. However, personal security known changes in the nature of the conflict or the threat felt at the individual level. Some threats follows a pattern which can be predicted in terms of public perception on the state of conflict that knows no manifestation at the individual level, but only when majority of the population is affected. Thus, we can say that when interest groups are affected, feeling of insecurity may give rise to social problems.[12]

Our research deals with individual perception, and collective citizens of a state located in an area of regional insecurity. Previously we presented conflicts in Romania's vicinity, and the last of these (annexation of Crimea) and the incident between Turkey and Russia, tend to develop a collective perception of insecurity in terms of personal safety, but also the state.

Gabriel Neagu considers that the feeling of insecurity arises from the feeling of danger the physical integrity of the individual (military conflict or strong tension between states) or simply on financial security. Thus, a company involved in a military conflict or in the immediate vicinity of a / some conflict (s), directs resources toward solving some of these problems, putting citizens in difficulty.[13] In our case, the British government increased the defense budget for 2015. In the year 2014 according to the Defense Ministry[14] budget, the allocations from the state budget was 5,843,745 lei, compared to 2015 when were allocated 6.279.080 lei. In light of recent events (Turkey and Russia) we believe that the defense budget for 2016 will be much higher.

"At the individual level, the only thing that will count is to survive the conflict. If a company faces other forms of insecurity - economic, political - the authorities will have to face public protests manifested by strikes, political instability generated by changes of government etc. Social instability and / or the policy although common in such periods do not support a country's economy or society's cohesiveness. "[15]

Citizens of Romania, in 2015, the result of a survey by the Romanian Institute for Evaluation and Strategy (IRES) on a sample of 1519 individuals aged over 18 years have shown, answers offered as part of wars in the area they consider a threat to the state. Type sample was stratified, probabilistic and nationally representative, with a maximum tolerance of $\pm 2.5\%$.

In terms of individual security, see the chart below that average is 5.45.




Chart 1[16]

12% of the respondents, believes that Romania is very uncertain in terms of *security of individuals*. However, this figure covers all risks included in the survey. Also, most of the respondents (22%) have a 5, and 7% rated by 9, while note 10 was given 1% of respondents.




Chart 2[17]

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We see from the chart above that 62% answered yes to the questions that affect the risk of armed aggression on the part of a great power, and 59% believe that there is a risk of aggression from a neighbor. Extrapolating, we can state that both great power and neighbor is Russia, and this is due to the annexation of Crimea - Russia as a great power, it demonstrated that it is able to violate any international treaty.



Chart 3[18]

We note that the term caveat that Romania is the main risk of war. The citizens of a State which is not in close proximity to a zone of conflict, or in areas of regional insecurity, would have no reason to charge the armed conflict as a principal risk. But the citizens of Romania, due to Russia's actions, realized that relations between Moscow on the one hand, and NATO and the EU, on the other, are becoming increasingly strained, so fears of a war between two major powers begin to take shape.




Chart 4[19]

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In the medium term, the respondents point of view, the idea began to lose ground war, and this is due either possibility of resolving tensions through diplomatic or economic crisis is mainly regarded as a risk by try\3ing to resolve *tensions*.




Chart 5[20]

In the long term, compared with the average term, the war begins to be considered a major risk. See from *Chart* 5 that war and economic crisis the same position, but the military conflict gaining ground compared to the penultimate period (average). This indicates fear of a war in the distant future.

CONCLUSIONS

Quality of life in a state located in close proximity to a zone of conflict, or in an area of regional insecurity, decreases in the population, and the main reason related to each individual. But the reasons are the most diverse: people who feel the fear of a war between Russia and NATO; people who believe that the relationship with Russia, Eastern Europe will suffer (increasing gas prices, energy, etc.); another category is contemplated that the geographical area in which Romania is considering, perhaps rightly, that the Russians are close and are a serious threat to our state.

Individual Fear of war is maintained in the media lately. The information can be accessed easily and that the actions of the states involved in conflict or a crisis that presents are taken from newspapers, radio or TV stations. However, in the structure information transmitted by the population, most often, a small bias can be found.

According to surveys that we have presented in this article, we note that the short, medium and long war, attacking Romania by a neighbor or by a great power, is among the first places. Such concerns may be possible in a regional area without conflict.

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