

DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. SOME CONSIDERATION ON THE DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES OF THE DECOMMUNIZATION STATES

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Abstract:

With the extinction of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the vacuum left behind by them, states have entered a stage of political crisis and establishing future trajectories in terms of governance. In this paper we propose to discuss several aspects concerning different trajectories of post-communist states and the factors that influenced their journey

Keywords: democratization, communism, post-communist state, Eastern Europe

Confusion felt in the early 90s resulted in a number of countries to evolve into a more slow compared to others. This could be observed over time through simple comparison on political stability, economic stability, quality of life, etc. How was this possible? Catalin Zamfir argue this confusion in terms of political enthusiasm encountered in the first days after the revolutions anti totalitarian. The mood has undergone a transformation in the collective anxiety, followed by a general confusion and a strong sense of powerlessness[1]. Grugel stresses that this confusion is based on a completely different aspect. It focuses on the role of regional and national impulse of democratization and highlights the fact that the country in some states categorically rejected communism, and it can be divided into two categories: the first part formed different organizations and opposition movements and the last They showed a passive avoidance rule form - form that can be understood as acceptance based on fear or simply complacency. In 1989 the civil society meet ambivalence can be explained in the context of ongoing revolutions anti totalitarian: in the first case was considered the question that transitions represented only victory the project developed by civil society, and in the second case was put the people in question ambiguous role in the overthrow of the totalitarian regime. This problem becomes questionable, and both situations really seem to enjoy the party. Regarding the draft general democratization of civil society organizations in mind the emergence of the religious type of the trade unions and movements for peace and human rights that occurred before 1989. We find this argument to be

sufficient to conclude that the democratization of exclusively on civil society? For Marata, civil society has proved able to overthrow totalitarian regimes but unable to provide a clear direction of what was to follow, but we want to argue that democracy and the market economy are not enough in a country where civil society does not It is active. Thus, Dahrendorf in his "Moral After 1989, revolution and civil society," argues very clear from this idea that the foundation of the open society must make available life around independent state associations, to guarantee freedom. It highlights very clearly that "even the public sphere is not primarily political, to say nothing of the sphere of economic activity"[2] and the difference between socialism and structures of liberal existence, finally, a plurality of autonomous associations that are not constituted all (possibly only a small part of the many associations) for the same purpose but concern the activities. Would it be fair to ask why we consider an essential pillar associations for freedom? First it, according to Dahrendorf, protects our natural state of inconveniences, and possibly prevent a monopoly came from designated major or minor car. James Madison said that civil society in existential , is "broken into many pieces, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or minorities will not be very threatened by interesting combinations of the majority", but it is worth noting that for a new society, such as post-communist states to early 90s who have recently acquired freedom, active civil society is a big hope for guaranteeing rights and freedoms, but also for the recovery of skidding tendencies democratic government. These slips into a new democratic society can be quite common, and this is due to the revolutionary times were intensely politicized. In any regime change there are some policies that have an interest or gain, so different people, as if the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe have been driven from their ordinary lives, the head groups. Thus, the top can often get unusual figures. For example, the author Janos Kis within his party lost the election, and historian Bronislaw Geremek not obtain a majority in parliament.

Noting Dahrendorf's arguments, we understand from this that civil society not as a single pawn positions in decommunization of Soviet bloc but gives credit both totalitarian regimes and overthrow the government correcting slippages. In previous chapters we discussed the involvement of various Western countries in the Soviet bloc and the action taken by them in terms of supporting various organizations through initiating various anticommunist plans for economic aid, but also their material. In our opinion decisive role in overthrowing the communist regime in the Soviet Union is the civil society and the West together and not separately, but in 1990 when states try a reorganization policy following the revolution anti-totalitarian space for disagreement social suffered from strong limitations - this It not provided and we support that was due to strict economic reform process has been guilty of fracturing of civil society movements and their weightings in contesting the state[3].

The theories that helped democratizing countries were largely inspired by Western European experience, this sharing them some key assumptions. Many of these were subsequently challenged going as a simple premise but largely true: the application of these assumptions developing world seem to fail due to a lack of democratic mentality. Post communist experience offering a comprehensive set of key challenges and constraints revealed that shaped the process of building the state[4]. Although initially the situation did not appear to pose Member freshly liberated from communist dictatorship faced a difficult situation when it came time for citizens to bring to power through fair elections, leaders able to build capitalism and democracy. If at that time were not observed serious discrepancies regarding science policy leaders, more than 25

years distinguishes a difference concern among countries that have benefited from leadership directed towards the rule of law and economic prosperity and States They were not part of it[5].

With the entry of states in the democratization process have been (and are) witnesses to a new and important development in the history of democracy: politics and administration have moved into the forefront of the democratization project. Viewed superficially, this development came like a surprise to those who have argued that democratization was a class assignment to agents and social movement or a matter of establishment and reform the electoral process and the rule of law[6]. C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite* talked about that a mistake was made when it was thought that the masses were situated on the road to victory, showing the influence of the autonomous community, first of all, it is increasingly reduced and the second is a guide. It is worth mentioning that the masses should not be regarded as a public that acts autonomously, but as a mass manipulated in crucial moments to become crowds of demonstrators, so we can say, the audience becomes a popular meal sometimes becomes crowd[7]. We note that in those reported by Mills found that the fear democracy tends to be minimal. A feared but contradicted by Georges Bourdeau in his writings on " Democracy that governs" and that supports the idea that democracies began by being governed but they made up for governments - the popular will is one that requires the state and its decisions. Taking this into consideration we could say, without committing an error, that the idea of popular government, launched Bourdeau, it can be classified as the ideal, and Giovanni Sartori actually reported in the book *Theory of Democracy Reinterpreted*. This undermines the assumption of ruling democracy, showing that less power to the governing class does not, necessarily, more power to those who are governed. The game must not be zero-sum. He can be a negative-sum game in which both sides lose, and lost the power of those who govern is not won by the governed. This is the evolution that has gained increasing attention and has been described as a state of overload and an inability of government[8].

Disability proved to be exploited using propaganda among citizens dissatisfied by neo-communists, revolving around several elements: blaming on how to share the moments vital - Democrats were left drunk with victory against communism and omitted act when necessary. As an example we can give Yeltsin that in the long confusion followed the coup (September-October 1991) instead of acting to organize new elections and carrying out further reforms approached the old device Communist Party seemed a traitor to those who it -They helped to power. Crisis power of the state shall be deducted from the fundamental alienation of citizens who are called to represent. Because indifference and distrust citizens no party will reach a mass audience; the absence of major parties in the Western sense of the term leads to the impossibility of creating a stable majority in Parliament - no stable majority weaken the executive. The latter urges the president to multiply "extraordinary powers" chronic exceptional situation thus created completely alter the game Institutions[9].

In addition multiplication of power in some Member nationalism was the one who gave the president power. With the implosion of the Soviet bloc suffered a disintegrating Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia was based on new Serbian hegemony. This is the most obvious example of state who suffered a considerable slowdown (nearest stop) the process of democratization and lagging behind compared to the rest of the region. I said that nationalism was the one who gave the president greater power but still he was guilty of the destruction of Bosnia and Kosovo in the 90s. President Milosevic remained in power by using nationalism which played an important role

in limiting opposition and with the NATO intervention in 1999 to protect Muslims in Kosovo, control of Milošević strengthened considerably simply because Serbs precepted attack NATO as attempted destruction of the state. Instead of civil society to understand that suffered damage due to its strict leader and how to lead, they preferred to provide more support and going on the grounds stated above. Understandably backwardness of the former Yugoslavia given that they have suffered damage severe: about 62% of the transport system has been destroyed, 70% of the energy industry and 80% from oil refineries have suffered damage due to bombing . Besides trying to complete the democratization process they saw and put before a plan of reconstruction material[10].

The problem of statehood in the early 90s has become a powerful contour in most post-communist states. It was imperative for the state to be redesigned[11] to be included in democracy. But in terms of power, the state freshly decomunized encountered little difficulty in the first years of democracy because it was presented as an emanation of the people, but such legitimation had been invoked by the totalitarian state's propaganda says that "represents the people as a whole "[12]. The problems encountered were found at the collective mentality and hatred well etched against the communist regime. Given that the man postcommunist any political association with a gang of crooks equivalent (at the party or state) call to " sovereignty of the people" became insufficient to give post-totalitarian regime legitimacy[13].

The democratization process envisages transformation of the state and skills and its role in a manner in which citizens are not affected during or after its completion. Compared with the communist state, the new democratic state requires a new rational. We can no longer talk about an excessive secrecy about a shortage of disinterest towards society[14].

Previously shown that Western Europe has served as a model for the former communist states, but from a historical perspective the state of Central and Eastern Europe was considered above the western states - over time feel a superiority in Central European states, in Politically and economically, by the end of the nineteenth century, since at that time the state has decided that some areas undercurrents in the private sphere in Western Europe fall within their powers. "For SCHÖPFLIN discretion of the state in the East originated in royal privilege principle, according to which leader has the right to take action in any policy area, unless the law explicitly prevents this. This principle has allowed the state to maintain and promote their own autonomy in key areas of taxation and military organization. The company was too weak to exercise control over these areas, thus being unable to support their autonomy from the state. Communism has used the established tradition of strong state, not only in Russia and the former Soviet Union but also in Central and Eastern Europe "[15]. Cicero's concepts after (acceptance of submission to justice) and usefulness (community of interest), fundamental in the West, are forgotten. None of these expedients will not remedy a deficiency essential legacy of the totalitarian order, deficiency of law. This shows the following symptoms: 1) laws are not really laws with (not prescriptive, not applied impartially, are confusing or ambiguous forms); 2) they are implemented; 3) laws are not applied to certain categories you violate (state / party and its representatives); 4) laws are applied to those who violate them. Justice applies only to certain narrow areas of social existence[16].

Regarding the state, Kelsen starts from the claim that can not be conceived outside the law given that it has jurisdiction through a legal structure, establish order and guaranteeing freedoms.

The modern political right are by coercion, preventing any form of restriction of freedom on the premise that any attempt to hamper freedoms constitute a beginning of anarchy[17].

When we are talking about a crisis of the state in mind its starting point, namely reform of the whole society. In the previously reported leaving the grounds that any attempt to restructure the state lead to a crisis with a short, medium or long, and determinants for a longer period of crisis are: 1) the government through policies implemented to reorganize state are found to be guilty of the long period of crisis and 2) functional rules inherited. Thus, "asserting individualism has resulted recoil tutelary state, various forms:

- Kickback ideological in the sense that public opinion is increasingly convinced of the superiority of the market in relation to state control;

- Recoil functional failure of the welfare state due to the many tasks that it has arrogance and insecurity courses of action;

- Recoil strategic economic globalization phenomenon before, by restricting de facto autonomy and therefore the power of state intervention as a result of capital mobility, technology, communications"[18].

Returning to the four above symptoms, we understand that they arose from desire communism leader / political class agreed to express power, making chronic felt in the early years of post-communist regime. Although democracy ensures coexistence in peace, citizens after the collapse of communism, seeks to take revenge showing contempt for the law and treating it as a defeated enemy. Basically, we are dealing with a problem felt across the mindset that allowed (induced) development in the period before 1989 was felt at the event in the early years of post-communism.

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