POST-COMMUNIST DEMOCRATIZATION: DIFFICULTIES AND CRISIS

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ABSTRACT. This article aims to present obstacles to democratization in the early 90's in Central and Eastern Europe from the question "Why democratization had difficulties?". Given the previous question, in our scientific approach was imposed to bring to the fore two issues defining the democratization of former communist namely "post-communist crisis" and "inheritance" of communism that made the process of democratization may meet difficulties because well established Leninist ideology in people's minds.

KEYWORDS: Postcomunism, Transitology, Democratization, Communism Legacy, Ideology.

Introduction

From preconceived idea that democracy for the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, was in the early 90's novelty, so to the horizon was foreshadowed a road leading towards the *unknown*.

We decided to address this issue - *Difficulties democratization in post-communist states* - for reasons of importance of the topic. This study aims to present different negative aspects hindering democratization in post-communist community. Research methods used to develop this study are deductive method, the relationship question - carry and descriptive analysis.

On the basis of our scientific motivation is found the following hypothesis: democracy in the early 90's, was a novelty for fresh decomunizate states. After the difficult years that communism was the one who dictated both as treatment and as ideology, countries had to decide on its future.

Bringing to the forefront of discussion Communism as an ideology, I want to highlight the fact that the end of this regime, which has opposed no resistance to survive was due to loss of self confidence. Thus we can easily say, without making the slightest mistake, the totalitarian Stalinist regime represent an "ideological project of high temperature"[1], which, says Giovanni Sartori in his book Democracy Reinterpret Theory was based on dogma but paralyzed because of it. It could take a while but it certainly would not have been possible change given [2] that over time "it was obvious that his alleged << infallibility cognitive >> will degrade" [3].

The defeat of the communist regime to democracy not only signifies the end of a long period of competition so that "the purpose of competing ideologies, history had come to an end" [4] in terms of totalitarianism.

Theories that helped democratize states were largely inspired by Western European experience, the sharing out a few key assumptions. Many of these were subsequently challenged going as a simple premise but largely true: the application of these presumptions developing world seem to fail due to lack of democratic mentality. Post-communist experience, offering a comprehensive set of key challenges and constraints revealed that shaped the state-building process [5].

Former communist countries have been in a difficult situation: citizens should bring to power through free and fair elections, leaders able to accomplish democracy and capitalism, and to more than 23 years, easily it is noted the difference between countries led by leaders who have the will and political science to lead the country towards the rule of law and economic prosperity and those who have not had anything like this [6].

Post-Communist Political Crisis

In order to continue talks on the political crisis in the early 90s, I want to get an explanation on the following question: Why there was a political crisis? Tocqueville believed that the democracy after its latest limits is harmful to the art advance of governing and that it is suited better to a people with an administrative education than a novice people. Given the above, should be considered that states had no democratic tradition, and after the fall of the Soviet totalitarian regime, the horizon was heralded a new world. This world can be compared, in Jowitt's view, the Genesis [7]. This statement can be made on the political opening there had built a future. If you were to ask who should be responsible for the issue of building a democratic future, natural response would be those who had obtained power.

Studying the logic of events, new leaders understand that they did not have solid knowledge about politics. They found themselves in an unknown world, which knew nothing and about which they could not read in any book of political science. To these political leaders may be attributed to the fact that they minimized the role of civil society in rebuilding state. I say this starting from the premise that in 1989, revolution took place and with the people. Although unions and other organizations (religious and human rights movements) occurred as a sign of development of civil society before 1989, The influence of cohesion and has declined with the onset of transition [8].

Guilty of this decreasing of the importance is political society due of his role too much and assumed that the beginning of the process of democratization. Do you understand that the parties could not replace the company so that its weakness in postcommunist democracy represent a significant limitation. In the absence of vigorous social organizations are hard to imagine not only participation and citizenship, but also how they could create pressure to produce reforms and change state [9].

Democratization was wrong thougt given that post-communist societies have begun reverse the first step is the introduction of free and competitive, so that in 1990, all citizens having the right to vote. Free elections were necessary to remove the old regime, they are today a regular and periodic policy in Central and Eastern Europe.

The most important features of the post-totalitarian heritage are elements missing - the rule of law and civil society institutions. The actions of communist regimes have created mistrust in important institutions of society [10]. As proof, in September 1990, Prime Minister Ryzhkov felt compelled to say: "I do not want to dramatize. Do not want to scare anyone. I have no right to do that. But the laws are not followed, the decisions are not respected. There are massive violations of laws, not to talk about criminal abuses " [11].

"Transition countries have been a laboratory for investigating the relationship between politics and economy reform. Indeed, they have gone through, and in some cases still going through a process of radical political and economic reforms profound change " [12]. Given this, question that we put and while we are trying to answer: why for some former communist countries, democratization process took less? Surely this was due to the crisis of legitimacy that has obscured a long task of rebuilding the state." All post-communist disorder resulted from the feeling of having obtained a victory too easy, to some extent undeserved. It is also the result of the collapse of shared delusions in both the East and the West: it was believed that once the Communist Party will be removed from the scene, democracy and market economy will be set up in a natural way, bringing with their abundance. All underestimate the devastation of communism - material, especially psychological and moral" [13].

Returning to Genesis about what I was talking above, the states out of the communist can easily be likened to a certain extent with this, considering that all had become a political void where all were free, and who was leading suffered a noticeable lack of Political Science. Although I brought up The Creation of the World want to mention that a comparison is slightly exaggerated considering that in the beginning "the Earth was formless and empty"[14]. In this case we can't say the same thing. We had something from which to go, and what we should to create [15] it represents only a contrast [16] to the former totalitarian regime. We need "a new way of life consisting of a new ideology that rejects radically existing institutions (socials, economics, religious, militaries, administratives, politicals, culturals - all) and which ask to avoid them also claiming the creating of some alternative institutions - mutually exclusive - with superior features (elements of resentment is essential)"[17] and the rehabilitation of all what had been banned during the communist era, everything what is supposed to have been taken from the pages of National History [18]. In other words, the crisis of power and of the state are derived from fundamental alienation of citizens who are called to represent. Because of indifference and distrust of citizens, no party will reach a mass audience; without major parties in the Western sense of the term, it would lead to the creation of a stable majority in parliament: the absence of stable majority cause the weakening of executive. The latter encourages the President to multiply extraordinary powers chronic exceptional situation created, which completely alter the game institutions [19].

Francois Thom believed that the appeal to *popular sovereignty* in which ordinary citizen of communist world get used to see hypocrisy, it isn't enough to give a certain legitimacy post-communist regime. For post-Soviet man, any political association, whether at state or party levels, equivalent to a band of crooks. Cicerone's notions after (accepting submission to justice) utility (community of interest) and fundamentals in the West there are forgotten. None of these experiences will remedy a essential deficiencies, legacy of totalitarian order, lack of law. This represents the following symptoms: 1) laws are not really laws (not prescriptive, not applied impartially, there are confusing or ambiguous in the form), 2) laws are not applied, 3) laws are not applied to certain categories that violate (state / party and its representatives), 4) laws are applied to those who don't break them [20].

Communism Heritage

Then, when we bring to the forefront the post-communist regime we consider that it is only a reaction to the previous regime, and in this case the necessity for democratization process is just an application produced by this reaction. The present situation is founding in a predictable difficulty considering that the inheritance of the old regime make their presence felt.

Where basic institutions of democracy are absent or very poorly developed, democratization has to start from scratch. This is more difficult than establishing a

democracy in succession an oligarchy. Instead of developing and reforming existing institutions, a new post-communist democracy should create institutions on an empty place [21].

Churchill launched a hypothesis that explains that the regime "post" - post-totalitarian shall not be attractive, in a positive mode for being preferable to the old one. If legacy of the old regime makes this one unpopular or ugly, it is enough for the new democracy appear better. But as the old regime was totalitarian and ineffective, the greater will be his legacy negative and therefore the more difficult the transformation of political institutions in a democracy. For now, the new regimes of this kind could only be "incomplete" democracies. The main concern regarding dynamic of an incomplete democracy is: in which direction it is going[22].

If political systems *partly free* - even among the *pioneers* democratics of the region - there is a significant heterogeneity concerning the distinction how the citizens live in democracy. A first type of heterogeneity, called *ethnic and territorial fragmentation* by Jowitt, is inherited from the communist regime. This *fragmentation* contains many restrictions on minorities in post-communist countries: restrictive laws on citizenship, directed against the Russians in Estonia and Latvia or against Serbs and Croats in Slovenia - are direct consequences of the disintegration of multinational communist states and in largely represents previous policy allusive retaliation for minorities under Leninism[23].

Another *important* legacy is corruption. This is not only widespread in most of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but there are few indications that things are moving in the right direction even despite numerous domestic and international anticorruption initiatives. Making a comparison between Western democracies and former Leninist countries, we see that the latter has a substantial gap in controlling corruption this can be seen in perceptions of business people and citizens [24]. Given the above, citizens of former communist states are likely to claim different actions which aren't comply with the public interest. When I say this I'm thinking at the fact that after 1990 some citizens of the Member recently de-communist elude the payment of taxes, and the lack of well-defined laws didn't make the State just a tax haven.

Although such actions may pale in comparison with the *sins* of high-level corruption, it still creates an extent of complicity between elites and ordinary citizens, which helps to perpetuate the system in a manner reminiscent of complicity with the communist regime.

So far the discussion has identified a number of important areas of social and political development of the former Soviet bloc that still carries clear traces of common Leninist heritage, including civic attitudes, in the development of civil society and paternalistic policies. From this point of view, the common heritage which emphasized Jowitt still remain after many years of *transition*, especially compared to the optimistic expectations of type *tabula rasa* of the transitology school [25].

Conclusions

In communist countries, democratization is simply out of dictatorship. In former communist countries, democratization also means entering into unknown territory of a society and a market economy [26].

Tismaneanu says that in the communist space must distinguish between periphery and center, between European countries with imposed communism (by force) and first hand communism, native, who imposed. Giovanni Sartori believes that for the first countries, the end of communism is a dual release. It is not just the acquisition of internal freedom, but also the release of external pressure. "The initial euphoria of the freedom speech, of the protest and of the vote passes quickly, but freedom as independent, as

foreign release, is a constant joy. For original communist countries, for Soviet empire isn't so: it is exactly the opposite' [27].

After many years of *transition* it seems to persist post-communist democratic deficit, although a surprisingly small part of this democratic deficit can be attributed to failures consistent with predictions of Jowitt (military coup, antidemocratic role of the Catholic Church and the new political experiments). However, a closer look at the political patterns shows interesting shades of connections between the communist heritage and the extent of political freedom.

References

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