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THE PROCESSES OF ESTABLISHING THE POLYARCHIES

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Abstract: *IF THE EFFECTS OF A POLYARCHY WERE NOT DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF A NON-POLYARCHY OR IF THEY WERE UNIMPORTANT, WE WOULD HAVE NO REASON TO OPT FOR POLYARCHY AND NOT FOR A ONE-PARTY DICTATORSHIP, OR VICE VERSA. ROBERT DAHL OPTS FOR POLYARCHY, FOR DEMOCRATIC REGIMES AND FOR AN INCREASINGLY ASSERTIVE HUMAN BEING.[3] THROUGH A PEACEFUL EVOLUTION THERE ARE MOST CHANCES TO REACH A POLYARCHY SUPPORTED BY A WIDESPREAD SENSE OF LEGITIMACY*

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INTRODUCTION

The most drastic and visible changes occur in the case of the rapid transition from a one-party hegemonic regime to a polyarchy: the hegemony of the single party is suddenly replaced by two or more rival parties, as happened in Italy, Germany and Japan. the end of World War II.

In Britain, after the reform of 1832, the old Whigs gave way to a new Liberal Party, and the laws of 1867 and 1884 facilitated the formation and development of the Labor Party. In Norway, the struggle for peasant mobilization in the 1860s and 1870s led to the emergence of left-wing and right-wing electoral and parliamentary coalitions. Following the struggle for universal male suffrage, as won in 1900, new parties emerged. The first country in which mass suffrage was adopted - the United States - was also the first to resort to these forms of party organization.

In Britain, the introduction of broad suffrage and secret ballot in 1867 was followed by the establishment of many local conservative and liberal associations, as well as the famous pre-election meeting in Birmingham. It has been said that in most African countries a one-party regime is preferred because it is an expression of consensus or natural solidarity or is necessary for economic development, for building a nation from the various subcultures of that country or for ensuring political stability. (Dahl, 2000, p.8)

In the southern U.S., in order for whites to force blacks, a dual system had to be established here, a kind of polyarchy for whites and hegemony for blacks. And U.S. polyarchy. it was not fully comprehensive to the extent that the population of color was excluded. In fact, it was less comprehensive than most post-World War I polyarchies, because after the unanimous adoption of universal suffrage, no other polyarchical country (except Switzerland and the transitional polyarchy in Argentina) excluded a group of polyarchists. such a size.(Dahl, 2000, p.9-11)

MAIN TEXT

However, no polyarchy has adopted policies that have something of the constraint reached during the forced collectivization of the USSR, from 1931-1932, when millions of people were deported to Siberian labor camps or died executed or the cause of starvation. Following Stalin's silent purges in the 1930s, several million others were imprisoned, tortured and killed. Hitler's policy was also well known. In October 1965, when Indonesia switched from a pro-communist to an anti-communist dictatorship, it is estimated that at least a quarter of a million people lost their lives in just a few months. At the end of 1969, about 1,16,000 people suspected of communist sympathies were imprisoned.

If the effects of a polyarchy were not different from those of a non-polyarchy or if they were unimportant (Flavius Cristian Mărcău, 2019, pp. 69-76), we would have no reason to opt for polyarchy and not for a one-party dictatorship, or vice versa. Robert Dahl opts for polyarchy, for democratic regimes and for an increasingly assertive human being. (Simion, 2014, p.89) Through a peaceful evolution there are most chances to reach a polyarchy supported by a widespread sense of legitimacy.

The processes of establishing polyarchies:

I. Within an already independent nation-state

A. Through evolutionary processes: Great Britain, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Japan (from the Meiji Restoration to the 1930s), the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay.

B. By the collapse or removal by revolution of the old regime: France (1789-92, 1848, 1870), Germany (1919), Austria, the First Republic (1918), Spain (1931, Romania (1989).

C. By military conquest (after World War II): Austria, Second Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan.

II. Within a dependent state

D. Through evolutionary processes: Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Philippines

E. Through a struggle for national independence:, Finland, India, Ireland, Israel, United States.(Dahl, 2000, p.65-66)

The second process (B) - the establishment of the new regime following the collapse or revolution by removing the previous one - is rare compared to the first: In the best known cases - the French Revolution, the German Weimar and the Spanish Republic - the revolution or the collapse was followed by an unstable regime, which soon became involved in hegemony. By the sudden fall of the old regime, the newly established one does not inherit its legitimacy; the establishment of a new regime by revolution justifies the use of a revolution against itself. The most critical years are the first, when



the question of the legitimacy of the new regime is still raised and when there are still followers of the old one.

The third process (C) has so far led to the formation of surprisingly stable polyarchies in the four countries and have recently been transformed by military conquest.

The fifth process (E) is the best known and obviously the most approved by the Americans. As in the United States, Finland, Ireland, Israel, and India, the independence movement combined nationalism with the ideology of representative government and political liberalism. The ideology of democracy thus gained strength through the ideology of nationalism: to attack representative democracy was the same as to attack the nation. (Dahl, 2000, p.66-67)

In many of the new states where the feeling of belonging to the same nation is underdeveloped, the leaders of nationalist movements, who, in the struggle for independence, proclaimed democracy as their goal, once at the head of a new and fragile nation, see organized opposition as a threat to the integrity of the country. Thus, in the new states, nationalism does not encourage tolerance of dissent and opposition, but rather provides an acceptable justification for intolerance and repression (Flavius Cristian Mărcău, 2014a, pp. 105-110).

What further limits the fifth strategy is that it has been overtaken by recent world events. After the disappearance of the colonial empires, more sovereign states remained. And in a world of independent states, there is little chance that competitive regimes will be established by national independence movements.

If it is true that the third process (C) - the establishment of a new regime through military conquest - is unlikely to occur, then the first two alternatives remain the most viable: instead of a hegemonic regime a more competitive system will be established either by evolution, either by revolution.

Today's strongest polyarchs, who are characterized by a high degree of tolerance for any kind of opposition, have undergone an extremely slow transformation. At the end of the seventeenth century, "formal" opposition in Britain was still illegal and illegitimate. A century later, the idea of a more or less organized but "loyal" opposition in Parliament to Her Majesty's government had gained considerable legitimacy.

But it has passed another century until the UK to devise the current system of organized parties competing for the support of a broad electorate. Elsewhere, such as in France, attempts to short-circuit this slow evolution have often resulted in lasting opposition to the new regime. It is also worth remembering that in 1968, the U.R.S.S. celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. And although the extreme hegemony of the Stalinist period no longer exists, the U.R.S.S. it has not yet become a quasi-hegemony, and the most optimistic observers are of the opinion that the establishment of a quasi-polyarchy will take much longer than a generation.

Engaging citizens as participants within democracy makes the governance to be increasingly more democratic and efficient, build trust in public institutions. (Dobrițoiu, 2017, p.12.)

The evolution towards polyarchy will not need, in the future, as many centuries as it had in Great Britain, Sweden and other countries, and it will probably not be able to last as long, the evolution being in a short time, as was the case in Italy, Germany and Japan, for example, from 1919 to 1950.

Tocqueville proposes 3 conditions that facilitate the opening of the population to democracy and acceptance of polyarchies:

- the effects that beliefs have (especially those about equality)
- the degree of equality in the distribution of the land, the power being closely related to the land you own

- the state of military technology, that is, the relationship between technology and the ability of individuals to make use of coercion. (Dahl, 2000, p.68-69, 77-78)



In an agrarian society, land and the right to its fruits are the main source of status, income and wealth, the inequality of land distribution is equivalent to that of the distribution of political resources. Some societies had a strong predisposition to inequality, hierarchy and political hegemony. (Dahl, 2000, p.78)

Also, the military technology deepens inequalities, facilitating the monopoly of a small minority on the instruments of coercion, as in the common case of the knight armed to the teeth, in front of which the unarmed or insufficiently armed medieval peasant feels quite helpless and uses abstract notions via concrete terms and expressions. (Manasia, 2016, p.51) A small minority, with superior resources, establishes and maintains a hegemonic political system (often governed by a single leader), through which it can also exercise its domination over the social order, thus exacerbating inequalities. A negative example is the Spanish military monopoly, which was able to conquer and subjugate the advanced Indian civilizations of Mexico and Peru, or a positive example, when military technology supports equality, as in the case of relatively cheap and good muskets and rifles in eighteenth-century America. and the 19th century.

We can conclude:

1. It is unlikely that a competitive political regime and therefore a polyarchy will be maintained without a pluralistic social order. A social order with centralized domination is more favorable to a hegemonic regime than to a competitive one (and therefore to a polyarchy);

2. A country whose military or police forces are accustomed to meddling in politics cannot maintain a competitive regime, even if it is a pluralistic order and not one with centralized domination.

3. Agrarian societies seem to fall into two opposite categories: the traditional peasant society, associated with a hegemonic political regime, and the free farmers' society, associated with a competitive regime and the evolution towards a comprehensive polyarchy. The main factors that determine the direction of an agrarian society seem to be: the norms regarding equality, land distribution and military techniques.

4. Private property is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the existence of a pluralistic social order and therefore of public contestation and polyarchy.

5. In a country with a decentralized economy, regardless of the form of ownership, there can be a pluralistic social order, so public contestation and polyarchy (Sweden - all industrialized countries with polyarchical regimes have gone from a purely competitive capitalism to a mixed system, managing to maintain, along the way, the pluralist social order).

6. It is unlikely, however, that the phenomenon of public contestation, and therefore polyarchy, will exist in a country with a highly centralized economy, regardless of the form of ownership (Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution, dictatorships - in Italy, Germany, Japan, Spain and other countries - has shown us that private property is by no means a guarantee of a competitive economy or a political order that would allow public contestation, much less polyarchy). (Dahl, 2000, p.84)

Classification of polyarchies, quasi-polyarchies and non-polyarchies according to the degree of inequality of land distribution, 47 countries, Around 1960.

- "Comprehensive" polyarchies: Denmark, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, India, Philippines, Sweden, France, Belgium, Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Federal Germany, United States, United Kingdom, Austria, New Zealand, Italy, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Australia, Chile.

- Quasi-polyarchies: Panama, Colombia, Venezuela.

- Nonpolyarchies: Yugoslavia, Poland, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Libya, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, Nicaragua, Spain, Cuba, Rep. Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Brazil, Guatemala, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Iraq, Bolivia. (Dahl, 2000, p.106)



Polyarchy and subcultural pluralism

The example of polyarchies and quasi-polyarchies (from the early 1960s) with an accentuated or extreme pluralism, from the 3 countries with accentuated pluralism, we can say that in Belgium, subcultural conflicts have intensified since the early 60s, and In the Philippines, there has been a resurgence of guerrilla movements in rural areas (the third country is Lebanon). Of the six polyarchies with extreme pluralism, Sierra Leone is no longer even a quasi-polyarchy; Malaya was divided into two countries; India had strong language conflicts; In Ceylon, because of communal disputes and restrictions imposed on the opposition, many wondered for a time whether the country still met at least the conditions for a quasi-polyarchy; and Canada witnessed an explosion of Franco-Canadian nationalism. Of the six countries, only Switzerland was somewhat quieter. But even there, French-speaking citizens of Jura have recently called for the establishment of a separate canton. (Dahl, 2000, p.131)

In general, it is assumed that a high degree of socio-economic development favors not only the transformation of a hegemonic regime into a polyarchy, but also the maintenance of a polyarchy.

But it is not only countries with a high level of socio-economic development that have a competitive regime or even a polyarchy. Nor is the fact that all countries with a high regime of socio-economic development have polyarchies or even competitive regimes (India, a competitive regime - a true polyarchy) which in 1957 had a GNP of \$ 73 per capital; the USSR and Democratic Germany, both being hegemonic regimes at an advanced socio-economic level (in 1957, GNP was \$ 600); or Argentina (\$ 490), Chile (\$ 379), Cuba (\$ 431) and Uruguay (\$ 478), then between the "transitional" countries in which there is a competitive regime - the Philippines (\$ 220), Turkey (\$ 220) - and those in which there are none: Paraguay (\$ 114), Indonesia (\$ 131), Egypt (\$ 142) and Portugal (\$ 224). Although a competitive policy had been established in the United States long time before Tocqueville's visit, the country had already established a comprehensive polyarchy (for whites). In which Tocqueville wrote *Democracy in America*, in the USA, the GNP per capita was about \$ 350-400. What applies to the United States also applies to Australia, New Zealand and Canada, but to some extent also to Britain, Norway, Sweden and other European countries that had a policy in the nineteenth century. competitive (but not really a comprehensive polyarchy). In some pre-industrial societies, relations developed in the nineteenth century. competitive policies and in some cases even polyarchies: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Norway and Sweden. (Dahl, 2000, p.133-136)

In all the pre-industrialized societies of the nineteenth century that had a highly developed competitive policy, political leaders embraced a perspective and a strategy in which the development initiative was left more to non-governmental groups. The rulers of today's pre-industrialized societies opt more towards a conductor-type strategy and a tendency towards centralization and hegemony. If, nowadays, a pre-industrial society is not a suitable ground for a competitive policy or a polyarchy, it is certainly the consequence of social characteristics such as illiteracy and poverty.

The chances of a country moving to a competitive political system (and even more so to a polyarchy) and maintaining it depend on the extent to which that country's society and economy:

(a) Ensure literacy, education and communication,

(b) Creates a social order rather pluralistic than centralized under-represented and an authoritarian political culture.

(c) Avoid acute inequalities among politically relevant social strata (New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Norway, Iceland and Finland) While hegemony could be threatened by economic "success" through growing demands for liberalization politically, polyarchies were not threatened by this success, but by economic failure. And this is because economic difficulties, especially when they take the form of massive unemployment or rapid inflation, induce the need for a hegemonic regime and a centralized social order. (Dahl, 2000, p.134-140)

All the competitive regimes of the 19th century that managed to survive in the 20th century, like the polyarchies, developed a formidable executive power, with a great capacity for action.

One third of contemporary polyarchies have solved the problem of fragmentation by establishing bipartisan systems of various kinds. Much of the remaining two-thirds have successfully avoided extreme fragmentation by:

- A system consisting of two large, dominant parties and one or a few smaller parties, as in the Federal Republic of Germany.

- A system consisting of a ruling party, usually dominant, which wins almost 50% of the vote and therefore seats in parliament, where the opposition is grouped into three or more parties, as in India, Japan and the Scandinavian countries.

- A special coalition, consisting of two important parties, as in Austria, until recently, and in Federal Germany, from 1966 to 1969.

- A unanimity-oriented system, characterized by a high degree of consensus, as in Switzerland, where most parties are included in the executive. (Dahl, 2000, p.141-142)

The political evolution of Argentina at the end of the 19th century followed the polyarchy in a very similar way to that followed by Sweden, Great Britain and a series of other stable polyarchies, and after the victory of 1916 it went through the transition from the competitive oligarchy to a polyarchy based on the universal right to vote. The situation in Argentina was at least as good as in the three countries where polyarchy proved more sustainable — Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay. Towards the end of the 1920s, conservatives began to insistently attack the institutions of the Argentine polyarchy - universal suffrage, political parties, the Chamber of Deputies, the inefficiency and personalism of the president. Then came the economic crisis. The experiment of Argentine polyarchy was suppressed by a coup. Since 1930, polyarchy has never been truly established. The inability to trust and cooperate reduces the chances of polyarchy.

Although at the end of World War II, the conditions in Austria, Germany, Italy and Japan were by no means fully favorable to the establishment of polyarchy, by comparison, each of these countries a serious candidate for polyarchy. Greece and Turkey received aid to establish the polyarchy. All the countries that gained their independence after 1945 had conditions that were as unsuitable as possible for the establishment of the polyarchy (Flavius Cristian Mărcău, 2014b, pp. 93-102). However, Jamaica, Trinidad, India, the Philippines and Lebanon were ruled in 1970 by polyarchic regimes, and Malaysia and Cyprus by quasi-polyarchies.

US has the possibility to facilitate the transformation of countries like these into polyarchies, using three main strategies:

(1) invading and occupying the country, forcibly removing the respective system of government and replacing it with a polyarchy, then protecting it as necessary (India, Philippines, Jamaica and Puerto Rico) (Italy, Germany, Austria and Japan)

(2) supporting democratic - ie revolutionary - movements in the country through funds, weapons or other means; (The Hungarian Revolution of 1954 or the Revolution of Czechoslovakia in 1968)

(3) supporting the existing government through funds, weapons or other means and exerting pressure on it for change. (Dahl, 2000, p.145-149)

Attempts to impose polyarchy through direct military intervention have failed. The tragedy in Vietnam has shown how illusory it is to believe that the United States could establish, by its own will, a polyarchy in another country, by force. And the removal of one hegemonic regime by revolution can only prove to be a replacement for another.



CONCLUSION

Dahl offers several meanings to the concept of polyarchy:

1. The poliarchy can therefore be considered a type of regime and, at the same time (if understood historically) as a set of institutions that have resulted from efforts to liberalize and make more "comprehensive" the institutions of the nation-state.

2. The poliarchy can be understood as a system of rights, by which certain rights are guaranteed and protected, as well as a system of political control over leaders (in the sense in which Dahl defines "control", a definition presented in a previous section of this study) - an interpretation that, as Dahl acknowledges, is very close to Schumpeter's conception of democracy as a method of selecting leaders (and leaders have an interest in taking into account the preferences of citizens, although they are not obliged to do so).

3. The polyarchy can be considered as a set of political institutions necessary for a better approximation of the democratic process in modern society (of the nation-state and of representative democracy). (Dahl, 2000, p.21)

Dahl uses the stream of consciousness (Dudău, 2016, p.100) Dahl's fundamental strategy is to reserve the term of "democracy" for an "ideal system" and to use "polyarchy" as an approximation of democracy. (Sartori, 1999, p.153) Dahl is a valuable political writer and his strategies are very important for political literature. For an author to be understood at such profound level by the writers of a nation there would be a high demand of good translations. (Paliță, 2017, p.77)

No matter what country it is, the more opportunities there are to express, organize and represent political options, the more numerous and varied the options and interests that are likely to be represented in the governing process. The right to engage forces in such a situation will continue until the Security Council will have taken the necessary steps to maintain peace and security. (Tomescu, 2017, p.186) Therefore, in any country, the preferences and interests taken into account in the political decision will be more and more diverse in a polyarchy, than in a mixed regime and more numerous and varied in a mixed regime, of polyarchical type, than in a hegemony. The emphasis is therefore on the interests of management, integration with business strategy, obtaining added value from people by the processes of human resource development and performance management and the need for a strong corporate culture expressed in mission and value statements and reinforced by communications, training and performance management processes. (Alexoiu, 2016, p.28)

The need for an operational definition, for the real world, arises not only from the need to create a model that lends itself to scientific analysis, but also from the need for a democratic ideal - often compromised by association with political practice in regimes. " polyarchical "- to be able to become again a " value ", a safe guide for people who value among other principles, and that human dignity presupposes that he remains a social being and participates, equally with his peers, in the governance of the city

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