



COMPARING AL-SHABAAB (KENYA) AND BOKO HARAM (NIGERIA): BETWEEN RELIGIOUS PROSELYTISING AND TERRORISM

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Abstract: *THIS PAPER EXAMINES AL-SHABAAB AND BOKO HARAM ACTIVITIES IN KENYA AND NIGERIA. IT EXAMINES THE CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN EXPRESSED RHETORIC; CAUSAL FACTORS OF VIOLENT ACTIVITIES AND THE MODES OF OPERATION OF THE TWO MOST DREADED ARMED GROUPS IN AFRICA. RELYING ON PRIMARY, SECONDARY DATA AND CONTENT ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT LITERATURE, THE OPINIONS AND FINDINGS FROM SECURITY DEPARTMENTS, IDPS, AND INFORMATION ON THE DATELINE OF ATTACKS IN NIGERIA AND KENYA HELPS IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF HOW BOKO HARAM AND AL-SHABAAB CARRY OUT THEIR ACTIVITIES. ALSO, THEIR OBJECTIVES AND TARGET, ARMS AND WEAPONS USED AND OTHER OPERATIONAL MODES PROVIDE THE BASE FOR COMPARISON. THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IS ADOPTED TO SHOW THAT AL-SHABAAB AND BOKO HARAM ARE SIMILAR IN THEIR MODES OF OPERATION IN SOME ASPECTS AND ARE DIFFERENT IN OTHERS. THE TWO GROUPS COMBINE ELEMENTS OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, INSURGENT MOVEMENT, SEPARATIST AND ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS. THEY ALSO HAVE ELEMENTS OF MILITIA, ARMED GROUPS AND REBEL MOVEMENT. AND, FUNDAMENTALLY, AL-SHABAAB AND BOKO HARAM ADOPTS TERRORISM STRATEGIES AND TACTICS COUPLED WITH CONVENTIONAL MILITARY TYPE OPERATIONS BUT BOKO HARAM HAVE BEEN MORE LETHAL IN ADOPTING MILITARY STRATEGIES AND TACTICS SUCH AS GROUND BATTLE AND DIRECT ASSAULT AGAINST THE STATE MILITARY THAN AL-SHABAAB IN KENYA.*

Keywords: *PROSELYTISM, TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, BOKO HARAM, AL-SHABAAB IRREGULAR FORCE, COMPARATIVE APPROACH*

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INTRODUCTION

No doubt, the world and indeed Africa have been grappling with insecurity challenges in forms of violence and acts of terrorism occasioned by the activities of armed groups in the last decade, perhaps than ever before. In Africa, this insecurity has particularly assumed a devastating dimension in the twilight of the 20th century with the groups adopting more destructive methods of operations both in dimension and scope (Adeyeye, 2017 and 2018: 24). To be sure, since the 1970s, Africa has been the theatre and site of many of the world's deadliest conflicts, violence and wars. In Angola, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda, Sudan, Burundi, Liberia, Chad, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Malawi, Mali, Kenya and Nigeria, the story has the same (Okumu and Ikelegbe, 2010; Oloo, 2010; Mesfin, 2011; Guglielmo, 2011; Sabala, 2011; Fukuyama, 2014; Mills, 2014). This is succinctly captured by Grasa and Mateo (2010) when they argue that since 1960s more than half-50% of countries in Africa have witnessed or gone through violence, and to add, many of them are still currently facing conflicts in different forms and dimensions. Advancing factorial perspective of insecurity in Africa, debates, opinions and literature on African conflicts maintain that the background of violence in Africa lays in colonial experience and the realities of post-independence political and socio-economic situations and circumstances of most African nation-states (Okoyo, 1977), Duala-M'Bedy, 1984, Ake, 1985). And, that insecurity and violence depends on the nature and forms of socio-economic and political decisions, actions and inactions, principle of behaviour and conducts of leaders of African societies prior to gaining power and consolidating themselves in power.

This paper is concerned with comparing Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram by relating the rhetoric, views and the connectivity between expressed causal factors of insurgency in Kenya and Nigeria. It looks at the strategies and tactics adopted by Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Boko Haram in Nigeria. The paper argues that the two groups are similar in a number of ways and different in other cases. The two groups manipulate religion to carry out their activities. For instance, Boko Haram started with the preaching of Salafist ideology (forcefully motivated by IbnTaymiyya philosophy), a persistent defender of Sunni Islam (Akinrinde, 2020a). The divisions within the Shia and the Sunni sects and within the populations considered as Islamists or fundamentalists (those whose believe that Islam must involve all aspects of human existence, including politics and law), and the moderates (Nasiri, 2006; Hinshaw, 2014; Hoffman, 1995) serves as the base of religious proselytism in Nigeria. It further argues that the issue of insurgency can be located in the historical composition and post-colonial domestic activities of Kenya and Nigeria. It is then possible to say that the issues of inequality and injustice, structural violence and unequal distribution of national and communal resources, state violence, disconnection between the people and the government, coupled with lack of political will and moral authority are fundamental factors responsible for insurgency in the two countries and are parts of history and contemporary domestic environments of the two countries. In the same vein, unemployment, ignorance and poor or lack of education, endemic corruption in all its typologies (political, bureaucratic, administrative, economic/commercial, organised, and working class), the persistence of imperial capitalism, extreme poverty, issues bordering on natural resources, porous borders, rural-urban drift, elite and political contraption, ethnic and religious tensions, state weakness (state disintegration in terms of inability of the state to provide reliable security to the citizenry) are parts of the problems of history and of the exiting state apparatus of Nigeria and Kenya.



MAIN TEXT

Conceptual Issues

Proselytism: It is not impossible to confuse proselytism with evangelism but the two terms are not the same. When someone or group engage in evangelism, it means essentially that such person or group is mainly telling the people or population about a religious faith with a view to converting them using preaching method. Therefore, evangelism is based or premised on persuasion by the evangelist and approval by congregation or target audience. Evangelical approach of approach often includes lifestyle, friendship and creative. The method also may be door-to-door sermon and open-air-sermon or preaching. From this description, it can be inferred that evangelism can be described as acts of proclamation and means of advocating the gospel and/or zealous preaching of one's faith. However, to proselytise means to attempt to encourage other people to join one's religious faith, political organisation or any other group using other means that can include inducement and forceful attempt to convert and/or real conversion against the wish of the victim. Commenting on the issues of insurgency and terrorism in Kenya, Kagwanja (2014) observed that religion and the desire for faith expansion through conversion was brought to the centre of insurgency discourse in Kenya due to three (3) fundamental developments. These include the series of attacks by Islamist extremists championed largely by Al-Shabaab on churches and worshippers widen the fault line between Kenya's 82.2 percent Christians and the 11.1percent Muslim population. Attacks on churches such as the one in the Likoli area, Mombasa in July 2014 and the subsequent killing of the fiery Islamic cleric (Sheikh Abubakar Shariff 'Makaburi'), who publicly praised violence, Al-Shabaab and justified the Westgate Mall attacks in Mombasa and Nairobi exposed the impaired relationship between the two faiths.

The above development, according to Kagwanja (2014) had its root in the history of Kenya. He argued that over the last forty (40) years, Kenya dithered as its Sufi Sheikhs went to Saudi Arabia encouraged and supported by the radical Salafist religious institutions mainly in Sudan and Somalia, only to return to Kenya as radicalised Salafist with the sole purpose of converting the people to their Salafist faith. For example, in Kenya, Salafist institutions such as the Kisanni Islamic centre in Mombasa funded by Saudis in the 1970s has evolved to become the hub of radicalisation where radical clerics are trained such as Aboud Rogo. Meleagrou-Hithchens (2013) takes this argument further by narrating how native Kenyan Muslims became members of Al-Shabaab. He traces the growth of the various Saudi Arabia Salafist Islamic organisations in East Africa and maintains that the stronghold and main body of the Salafist had its root in Sudan and Somalia, in which Muslim-majority people were largely under autocratic regimes. Hence, these societies were transformed into centres of Salafi teachings (Sudan is particularly the most popular destination for Kenyan Sufi Sheikhs in search of training) and that many of them upon their training adopted Salafism.

Another impetus to Salafist high population which serves as impetus for religious radicalisation and terrorism was the fall of Siad Barre's regime in Somalia (bordering Kenya and with Somalis in Kenya). Salafist flooded into Kenya as refugees and started to make their way into the corridors of power; assume and gather influence among their kin (Somalis in Kenya), hence started recruiting native Muslim Kenyans. As stated earlier, they took over many existing mosques in Kenya which were largely moderate Sufi organisations that represented majority of Kenyan Muslims and indoctrinate them into the radical Salafist ideology (Field report, 2017). Also, the exogenous influence from Saudi Arabia responsible for funding a number of new Salafi organisations and groups in Nairobi is worth mentioning. One of such groups is the Kisauni Islamic centre established in the 1970s in Mombasa (Field report, 2017). It was in Kisauni that Aboud Rogo was trained in the 1980s. Ten years after, Rogo proved and caused to be accepted as a leading preacher in Kenya, and by 1990, Rogo had formed a very strong connection with jihadi Mujahidin across the world to the extent that majority of Kenya



Muslims had been indoctrinated into Islamic radicalism and some Christians also converted into Islam and by extension, Salafist radical ideology (Khairallah, 2013).

Comparing Al-Shabaab (Kenya) and Boko Haram (Nigeria)

This section compares Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram insurgents with a view to identifying their similarities and differences. The first part looks at the historical, religious, socio-economic and political factors while the second emphasise the elements of militia, armed religious and rebel movements and as combining elements of liberation, insurgent and Islamist movements. To start, it is important to begin by pointing out that conflict does not happen outside historical contexts and the objective condition of the operating environments (OEs), nor does it unfold in a socio-political or economic void (Petrus de Kock, 2011:7). Therefore, to appropriately compare the two insurgent Groups-Boko Haram (Nigeria) and Al-Shabaab (Kenya), the historical narrative and objective realities of the two countries is important. In the same vein, the causal factors of insurgency in Nigeria and Kenya and reasons that attracts insurgents in these countries are fundamental to the discourse. The factors are broadly categorised into domestic and external, geographical, ethnic composition, structural violence, political, economic and social realities and of course the religious (Islamic) fundamentalism. With respect to Kenya, the unstable neighbours in the Ogaden region also constitute a factor that attracts insurgents in the country (Mesfin, 2011; Sabala, 2011; Guglielmo, 2011). Also, attempt is made to briefly summarise the similarities and differences in terms of their history and domestic influence in Nigeria and Kenya.

The two countries (Kenya and Nigeria) have a history of colonial hegemony which largely conditioned and shaped their social constructions and by implication contemporary realities. In fact, many have argued that these countries are accidents of colonial creations. In the case of Nigeria, the late Obafemi Awolowo, Ahmadu Bello and others attest to the fact that the country is a mere geographical expression; a lumping together of many independent nations without consideration for the peculiar characters (Adebamwi, and Obadare, 2013; Adebamwi, 2007). In the same manner, Kenya is a conglomeration of many cultures and tribes lumped together into one entity by colonial fiat. To this end, since independence, smaller ethnic groups have felt threatened not only along the line of politics and membership of the main political parties (which has always been made up of bigger ethnic communities) but in the general political, economic and social environment. The situation of Kenya is comparatively similar to Nigeria. In Kenya, primordial citizenship, encoded in ethnic culture characterised by a sense of belonging to a particular nation such as being a Luo, Luhya, Kikuyu, or Kamba defines Kenya's political reality to the extent that it even promotes conflicts and encourages terror (Ojo, 2009; Suberu, 1990; Yieke, 2011: 47). Also, just like the history of the Igbo ethnic group in Nigeria, Kenyan Somalis in the north-east have a history of fractious relationship with the Kenyan state. Secessionist conflicts led to the Shifta war of the 1960s and the government's response has ever since, been repressive. Thousands of people are said to have been killed by the military in a massacre at the airstrip in Wagalla in 1984 and at the height of electoral activism in the 1990 and early 2000.

The history of armed resistance can also be mentioned as a conditioning factor for rebellion and insurgency in Kenya and Nigeria. Just like Nigeria, Kenya has a history of resistance dating back to the struggle against the establishment of colonial rule. The Nandi rebellion, which started in 1890 and lasted for eleven years, was one of the earliest rebel groups to object alien entry into the country. As of 1900, the Nandi combatants had succeeded in destroying a place known as Kitoto in the Nandi valley, a very crucial communicating apparatus (telegraph) centre, thus cutting off communication between the British government in Britain, its soldiers and railway employees in Kenya and Uganda (Yieke, 2011).



Notwithstanding the heavy British military operation against Nandi combatants, Nandi leadership declined to sign a peace agreement. Five decades later, the Mau-Mau freedom fighters mobilised widespread resistance against colonialism and foreign administration. The Mau-Mau movement mobilised people at grassroots level and administered traditional oaths to secure loyalty to the movement and thus a commitment to the liberation struggle. Those who were considered not sympathetic or perceived as betrayals (violating allegiance to the movement, particularly when such disloyalty and betrayal was viewed to be as a result of faithfulness and support for ‘‘alien or foreign Christian religion, which to the Kenyan movement represented the ‘white man’s religion’), were either seriously tortured or killed. Although there were no armed groups in the mould of Mau Mau in terms of the volume of insurgent activity in Nigeria’s colonial regime, however, there were a series of violence and non-violent resistance to colonialism. For example, the Agbekoya (farmers’ resistance groups) fought violently against colonial policies just like the Mau Mau. There were also the Aba women uprising (1923) and the non-violent resistance from the elite in Nigeria.

The internal failure evidence in socio-economic and political of state has been fundamental factors in the discussion of insurgency in the two countries. According to Akubor (2014: 1-130); Henley, 2015; Mills, 2014, and Fukuyama (2014), Nigeria is blessed with arable land; solid minerals and petroleum resources, and is classified as the largest economy in the continent. It is a well-known fact that Nigeria is endowed with natural resources (being one of the largest producers of foci fuel in the world), favourable geography and an enormous population (the largest black concentration in the world). Nigeria is equally a plural and heterogeneous nation, comprising of multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups (a classic case of an artificial nation put together by colonial fiat of 1st October 1960). However, there have been continuous frustration by Nigerians over the failure of the potentially wealthy nation to provide basic human needs such as education, food, portable water, reliable transportation and policies free from corruption. In the formative years of Boko Haram there is a high level of unemployment in the country (Akinrinde, 2020b). According to Nigeria’s former Finance and economic coordinating Minister, Okonjo Iweala (2012) (when BK activities was at its peak), there was high level of unemployment that stood at 23% as at mid-2012 and even higher among the youths with about 38% pervades the country’s Fiscal problems, debts and low economic growth dominates the economy, except for the 2014 rebasing of the economy which revealed a positive rise in economic growth (which is not reflective in the living standard and individual life of Nigerians).

In terms of external debt and absolute poverty, Okonjo-Iweala (2012) maintains that the total debt profile as at March 2012 (a period BH insurgency was at its peak), stood at N44.28 billion, while income level per capita is far below the international standard. In a report released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2012, the percentage of citizens in the country living in absolute poverty (those who can only afford minimal important needs, food, shelter and clothing) is 60.9%. Overall, development is low (Adeyeye, 2013:117 and 2011). When viewed from the regional level, the North-West and North-East geographical zones (the OEs of BH insurgency and terrorism) have the highest poverty rate in Nigeria (77.7 and 76.3% respectively). Similarly, in a recent educational survey report released by the NBS, the secondary school net attendance ratio revealed that the North-Central, North-east and North-west have 37, 22 and 24 percent respectively while the South-south, South-east and South-west have 28, 60 and 65% net attendance respectively (Sampson, 2014; Subair, 2012; NBS, 2012).

Just like Nigeria, Kenya has since independence, been positioned as a prosperous regional economy. Kenyan economy is one of the largest economies in the East African region, with the most important stock market and tourism. For example, it had the best real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 and real GDP growth projections among EAC member countries in 2010 and 2011. The following statistics confirm this assertion: In terms of real GDP, in 2009, (17% million) Kenyans had



17970; estimated annual real GDP percentage growth rate-5%; and estimated annual real GDP percentage growth rate in 2011 stood at 5.3% (KNBS, 2012, 2014). However, like Nigeria, mismanagement of resources and the economy, corruption, lack of public accountability, insensitivity of the leadership to the wistful, longing and desires of the majority of the population, weak governance, galloping inflation, unemployment and mass poverty characterised the two countries to the extent that the prospects for development do not impact positively on the lives of the people (Field report, 2017; Fukuyama, 2014). A factor many advanced is responsible for insecurity, terrorism and insurgency in these countries.

Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram as irregular forces (OPFORs): Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram usually search for support and acceptance of certain members of the society (both within their OEs and beyond) in order to acquire direct/practical or indirect/inactive assistance. However, the strategy used by insurgents to attain or obtain the assistance and control usually requires complicated and difficult operations in operating environments (OEs). It normally requires that they transmit and impart ‘legitimate’ stories capable of being accepted by the people such as pointing at the seeming failure of governments. Insurgents try to convince the people especially their followers that the methods they adopt are the right and workable approach through which they can realise collective social, religious or political good they desire. However, Boko Haram, sometimes arrogate the power to enforce rules or give orders outside of respect for the desires of the people to themselves. Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab often exhibits extraordinary elasticity and capability of survival even in the face of overwhelming security (hard power), coupled with political reactions by respective governments in the OEs. In these two cases, the ability and resilience of these insurgents are constant through ‘soft support’ received from respectful OEs. In fact, judging by the responses of the departments of security and military, the governments of Nigeria and Kenya are amazed by the remarkable ability of insurgents to sustain themselves despite all the intense government enforcement measures. This soft support, in the case of Nigeria, is rooted in the observation that many people, particularly in the north east, are sympathetic to the basic arguments put up by Boko Haram insurgents and accept them into and serve as cover for them (albeit at the initial stage), although they are not necessarily in agreement with the adoption of terrorist strategies, especially at the latter stage when their activities assume negative and destructive dimensions. Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram sympathisers are extremely important to the long-term positive outcome of these insurgents. The soft targets are responsible for providing them with aid, shelter and sanctuary (Musa Uba, 2015).

While many do not support their terrorism modes of operation, yet, they continue to show sympathy to the overall narrations within which insurgents construct their philosophy which is centred on the assumption that Muslims all over the world are assaulted, treated badly by strong and influential actors in the world led ultimately by the United States (Field report, 2017). Strategically, anti-US feeling and sentiments, no doubt, help motivate and instigate BH and Al-Shabaab stories and philosophies. As regards the general tactics adopted by irregular forces represented by the two insurgent groups under study, three main categories of tactics are obvious. These are: military-like function tactics, criminal activity and terrorism. BH and Al-Shabaab adopt the three tactics with assistance from passive and active supporters and independent actors (Falode, 2016; Onuoha, 2012 and 2014; Agbibo, 2014).

Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram essentially engage in irregular, indirect and asymmetric methods. They also engage the states of Nigeria and Kenya in military warfare and have continued to launch violent, savaged and destructive guerrilla-styled operations, targeting the governments of Nigeria and Kenya, and their populations. They attack schools, kill students in their dormitories, kidnap people, destroy villages, communities and state infrastructure and wreak havoc on the socio-economic and



political lives of the populations in Kenya and Nigeria (Field report, 2017; Falode, 2016; Oyewole, 2016a and 2016b). Essentially, findings reveal that BH and Al-Shabaab adopt a combination of conventional and non-conventional (symmetry and asymmetry warfare) strategies. They use guerrilla warfare, engage state forces in battle of annihilation, adopt deception and surprise attack, withdrawal, planned attack, distraction, night combat, infiltration and disguise, ambush, armoured operation, raiding, and pre-emptive strikes. They also carry out propaganda and engage in criminal operation such as bank robbery. Equally, kidnapping, hostages, redistribution of expropriated goods to the poor, media and electronic warfare, and exploitation of nationalist and religious sentiments are parts of their operational strategies. And, they carry out bombing, and have been found to engage women and young girls in their activities (Field report, 2017; Onuoha, 2014; Sani, 2011; Bamgbose, 2011; Falode, 2016).

The geography of the operating environments (OEs); the failure of institutions of state and exogenous influence assisted in the formation stage and further sustained the Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. For instance, Mbugua (2004:32) posits that main leaders of terrorist groups in Kenya are essentially made up of nationals from the Gulf States, Somalia, Pakistan and the Comoros Islands who have assimilated Kenyan domestic ways of life, values, beliefs, customs and behaviour along the area bordering the sea (a coastline by the Indian Ocean). These groups of people gradually proceed to the recruitment of locals. In the same manner, the Institute of Peace Report (May 2003), maintains that aliens and outsiders manipulate the very feasible laxity in the Kenyan immigration and security laws, coupled with endemic institutional corruption to procure and acquire Kenyan citizenship documents. Having been armed with the citizenship certificates, it is easy for them to establish small business organisations and Islamic non-governmental organisations (INGOs). This is synonymous with Nigeria where Chadians, Nigeriens, Beninois, and Cameroonians easily cross to the northern region without any immigration document (US Institute of Peace Report, May 2003).

Arising from the various reports and findings on the activities of Boko Haram, coupled with the cases of operations as highlighted in the chronology of attacks in chapter four, one important question is: Is Boko Haram a militia, religious or rebel movement? The table on the comparison of the group and Al-Shabaab in the table below help to answer this question.

Comparing Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram within the context of the elements of militia, armed religious and rebel movements and as combining elements of liberation, insurgent and Islamist movements

Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have the capacity to change their operational strategies and tactics based on environments and responses from state security forces. A view of the operations of the two groups show that they combine elements that depict them as armed militias, armed religious groups and rebel movement as provided by Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010). Also, their leadership and organisational structures, social base, funding methods, motivations and grievance narratives, purposes and their strategies and tactics depict them as liberation, insurgents, separatist and Islamist movements as highlighted by the descriptions given by Ikelegbe and Okumu's (2010).

In this regard, the two tables (1 and 2) below are used to show and confirm the above statement. Table 1 captures their motivations, goals and objectives, scope and size, funding and engagements/targets as it relates to the elements of elements of militia, armed religious and rebel movements. Table 2 shows and compares BH and Al-Shabaab in terms of organisations, leadership, grievance narratives and strategies, tactics and methods of engagements as related to their depiction as combining elements of liberation, insurgent and Islamist movements. Essentially, the tables help to show the similarities and difference between the two insurgent groups and to affirm their dynamism.

Table 1: Table showing comparison of Al-Shabaab (Kenya) and Boko Haram (Nigeria) in terms of goals, motivation, scope and size, engagement/target, social base and funding strategies within the context of elements of militia, armed religious and rebel movements

Components	Boko Haram (Nigeria)	Al-Shabaab (Kenya)
Goals	<p>Reflects clear religious (Salafist), Islamic law/rule,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Clear socio-political goals and reform of the state -Political goal- change of government -Socio-cultural-specific local/community/ ethnic issues *Resistance to, and overthrow of government *Resistance to western ideologies and values 	<p>Reflects clear religious (Salafist), Islamic law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Reflect Ethnic Nationalism-Somali-Kenyan interest in Kenya *Not specific about change of government in Kenya *Retaliation against Kenya's role in AMISOM
Motivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Identity-religious based, socio-political grievance and challenge with tainted with self-opportunism *Struggle for justice against structural violence and poverty *Global Jihad and revolution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Identity (religious) based *Socio-political grievance and challenge *Global Jihad
Scope and Size	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *A combination of small groups constructed around commanders/leaders with larger groups founded on Islamic leaderships and cells *Comprising large groups constructed as fighting units operating in and seeking territorial control *Drawing membership from different classes of people 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Larger group founded on Islamic leadership *Comprising large groups constructed as fighting units operating in Kenya *Drawing membership from different classes of people
Engagement/Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *A combination of low intensity conflicts in which they engage security forces and perceived enemies, civil population and security agencies, perceived infidels and deviants; and, *Intensive conflicts against government, pro-government on a wide territory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Combines low intensity conflicts in which they engage security forces and perceived enemies, civil population and security agencies, perceived infidels and deviants with *Intensive conflicts against government pro-government on a wide territory

Social Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Ethnic and community groups and youths *Religious and youth volunteers *Large social basis comprising of identity, non-identity and youths Conscription of women, young girls and young boys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Ethnic and community groups and youths *Religious and youth volunteers *Large social basis comprising of identity, non-identity and youths Conscription of child soldiers
Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Local extortion and levies in their captured territories *Plundering and ransom *Robbery *Local and Elite funding *External support *Extensive resource 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Local and Elite funding *External support *Trading and plundering *Piracy

Source: Compiled by the authors

The above table compares Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in terms of their goals, motivations, scope and size, engagement/targets, social base and funding. Also, the table shows that the two groups combine elements of militia, armed groups and rebel movement. While they are similar in certain areas they are different in some aspects. For instance, While Boko Haram engaged in taking over territories in the north-east region of Nigeria, Al-Shabaab's operations in Kenya does not include taking over territories.

Table 2: Comparing Al-Shabaab (Kenya) and Boko Haram (Nigeria) in terms of their organisation, ideology, grievance narrative, strategies, tactics, methods of engagement and, Leadership in the context of the elements of liberation, insurgent and Islamist movements.

Components	Boko Haram	Al-Shabaab
Ideology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Political programme and reform-to establish an independent Islamic state in Nigeria *Political Islam (Salafist doctrine) *Identity-anti-Western ideologies and values 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Political Islam (Salafist doctrine) *Political programme *Identity-anti-Western ideologies and values
Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Fundamentalist puritan reform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fundamentalist puritan reform
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Militant Islamic leaders *Excluded politicians and opposition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Militant Islamic leaders * Excluded opposition
Grievance narrative/rhetoric	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Political-mis-governance and Corruption *Religious-Unbelief and Corruption of Islamic doctrines, practices and governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Marginalisation and exclusion of Somali-Kenyan



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *To create Islamic revolution *Anti-Western education and ideals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Involvement of ‘Infidel ‘Kenyan government in Somalia crisis *Unbelief, Corruption of Islamic practices and governance
Strategies, tactics and methods of engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Hybrid guerrilla warfare and terrorism *Conventional military type warfare *Pitched battles from controlled territories in the Sambisa forest and other enclaves in the north-east region *Criminal-Bank robbery *inducement paying to recruit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Hybrid guerrilla warfare and terror *Pitched battles from controlled territories in Somalia *Terror attacks-taking hostage *Criminal-Piracy, inducement-paying criminals to carryout terror operations-throwing of grenades at public transport vehicles

Source: Compiled by the authors

One significant conclusion from the table 2 above is that the two groups combine elements of liberation movements; insurgent movement; separatist and Islamist movements. This situates the position that they do not have a clear cut agenda but their operations are often conditioned by their local and global environment and responses. Often times conditioned by the COIN and counterterrorism operations of the countries. From the table, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are similar in a number of ways. For example, in terms of political Islam ideology, but Al-Shabaab in Kenya does not really placed priority on political reform in the country. They are similar in their organisation, leadership style, strategies and methods of engagement. Although, Boko Haram includes poor governance in its grievance narrative, Al-Shabaab in Kenya does not emphasis poor governance component but sometimes mention the issue of ethnic nationalism as grievance narrative.

In terms of character and nature of criminal insurgency, the two groups are similar. It was pointed out in the previous chapter that insurgents often carry out criminal activities particularly resulting from the need for sustenance requirement such as finance to carry out their operations. The findings revealed that Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgents have turned into domestic, sub-regional, regional and transnational criminal groups for purpose of gathering funds. Although, insurgents often share operational activities with criminals they are often not on the same page in terms of principles, objectives and beliefs. Nonetheless, they cooperate on the common ground of sourcing for funds. This is because money is very important for the purchase of weapons. It is also needed for the welfare of members and recruits whom they pay to entice them. The pressing need for funds and survival has prompted Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram insurgents to engage in criminal operations in order to gather funds. On the one hand, it is no news that Al-Shabaab has been the leading actor in terms of piracy, on the other hand, they hire criminals to throw grenades at public transport vehicles. For example, the Kenya Security Report 28-12-12 Serial No. 251/2012 identifies Sheikh Hassan Mahat, a preacher in the Al Amin Mosque in Eastleigh, Nairobi as a front-runner in this method of operation. The report stipulates that Hassan often pays Ksh. 5,000 to each criminal recruited and has



carried out a successful operation and paid Ksh. 2,000 for an attempted but failed mission. It is reported that the hand grenade attack on Mukaro Hotel, owned by Peter Muraya Kihiu on 26 December 2012, in which the wife of the proprietor was injured, is one of the attacks carried out by hired criminals (Kenya Security Report 28-12-12 Serial No. 251/2012; Kenya Situation Report, 2014, 2015, 2016).

On the part of Boko Haram, the group has participated in bank robbery, raided markets for food and money and other items in its OEs such as stealing dynamites at Asaka Cement Company (see chapter 3). The fact that gathering large benefits and being able to avoid the consequences and difficult outcomes that may go with acquiring support from outside make illicit activities pleasant or appealing to Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram groups. To this end, abduction and kidnapping for ransom, extortion of money from victims, piracy, robbery operations and trafficking in SALWs, drug, human, black market goods, among others, are some of the favourite activities of the group (US Institute of Peace Report 2003).

CONCLUSION

In comparing Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram strategies and tactics, this paper concludes that the two insurgent groups are different in their formation and primary objectives but similar in a number of ways, especially as it relates to the use of terrorist strategies and tactics. They share similarity intelligence operation; how they gather information; and in their training method. Although they have similar tactical operations in certain areas but are somewhat different in carrying out some of these tactics, for instance, while Boko Haram members commonly use disguise by dressing as women; as school children and as military personnel, Al-Shabaab members are not found to use these methods. However, the two groups are part of AQIM network. The two groups adopt military and non-military strategies, guerrilla hit-and run tactics, manoeuvre and attrition strategies, engage in criminal activities, and have both assumed transnational and international dimensions.

It is observed that the strategies adopted by insurgents do not positively correspond with their aims and objectives (their objectives and operations are ambiguous). For instance, Boko Haram started as an Islamic group preoccupied with the teachings of the orthodox Islamic Salafi interpretation of the Quran and Hadiths which became political having been manipulated by political elites in Borno state, north east Nigeria. It soon radicalised following the extra-judicial killing of its leader, Muhammed Yusuf. Apart from the desire to create an Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria, the objective of the group remains cloudy due to the nature of its tactics and operational strategy which do not seem to have a clear direction.



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