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A PLEA FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

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Abstract:

THE MISSION OF INTELLIGENCE INSTITUTIONS, IN GENERAL, AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, IN PARTICULAR, IS ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT IN TODAY'S SOCIETY, ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTABILITY DETERMINED BY THE RAPID CHANGE IN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION.

THE ANALYTICAL COMPONENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS REQUIRED CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS, THUS BECOMING MORE THAN A SIMPLE AND TRADITIONAL STAGE OF THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE, INCLUDING THE ROLE OF INTERFACE IN RELATION TO LEGAL BENEFICIARIES AND EVEN CIVIL SOCIETY.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS HAS SEEN THE DEEPEST EVOLUTION IN RECENT YEARS, DUE TO THE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED IN THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE, THE DEVELOPMENT AND SPECIALIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND, LAST BUT NOT LEAST, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE COMPUTERIZED TOOLS, ADAPTED TO THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE GLOBAL SOCIETY

IN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, THE ANALYST MUST CUMULATIVELY MEET THE FOLLOWING QUALITIES: A SPECIALIST IN THE FIELD OF ANALYSIS, A GOOD EXPERT OF THE MANAGED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE, A SPECIALIST IN SOCIAL COMMUNICATION, LAST BUT NOT LEAST, A PROFESSIONAL WITH CLEAR ETHICAL AND DEONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IS A DECISIVE STAGE IN THE CYCLE OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, WHICH ADDS VALUE TO INFORMATION COLLECTED, SO AS TO ENSURE, BEFORE KNOWLEDGE, PREVENTION AND COUNTERACTION, THE ANTICIPATION OF THREATS AND RISKS OF SECURITY, THE ANTICIPATORY-PREVENTIVE DIMENSION BECOMING A PRIORITY FOR ANY INTELLIGENCE INSTITUTION.

Keywords:

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ARGUMENT

Today's global world is characterized by the volatilization of interstate borders, the exceptional mobility of capital, goods and people, the reactivation of frozen conflicts, the resurgence of military conflicts, the rapid evolution of information technology, the exponential diversification of media and, last but not least, the unprecedented increase in information in the public space. All these have led to the emergence and manifestation, with particular dynamism, of new security risks (unconventional/asymmetric hybrid), which have generated contagion effects, especially in vulnerable regions of the world, and have negatively influenced the security equation parameters at all levels of report (national, regional, global). Moreover, some unforeseen events that seem difficult to monitor and manage in recent years, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, are perceived in the collective mind as everyday features of the current global security environment. They have increased at the societal level the degree of uncertainty that has traditionally accompanied human evolution throughout history and marked its very existence.

The need to ensure a stable security climate, which guarantees the possibility of citizens manifest themselves according to their own will and aspirations, requires the proper management of these issues, through coherent state actions, both to ensure the allocation of resources and capabilities necessary to know and counter them, and to generate an optimal decision-making framework for achieving the performance and efficiency by the institutions involved in this approach. It is therefore necessary to re-examine the processes of collective thinking and analysis, including by outlining new action hypotheses at the strategic level, which would give the projected effectiveness and finality to the steps taken.

Circumscribed to the role and need for strategic knowledge to ensure the climate necessary for individual and collective security, the mission of intelligence institutions in general and intelligence analysis in particular is one of the most complex and important in today's society, especially in the context of instability determined by the rapid change of the context and the elements of defining the characteristics of information (Obreja & Rusu, 2009, pp. 35-37), which manifests itself more than ever. The evolutions registered in the last decades, at the level of the global society, have inevitably determined major changes in the architecture of the security environment, fact that imposed structural and action transformations of substance of the intelligence institutions (Medar, 2010, pp. 301-319), knowing that their relevance is determined, on the one hand by the ability to adapt to the specifics of risks and threats to be managed, and on the other hand by the ability to anticipate, know, decipher and understand their particularities and, last but not least, in turn, to prevent or counteract their materialization, or to diminish their impact on the elements that define the concept of national security.

The increase in the volume of information circulated in the public space and the fact that „the public media becomes (...) a source of information (for intelligence services)” (Matei, 2010, p. 133) determined the redirection of efforts from the search and capture area of information to refine the technical and human capabilities to interpret them (Nițu, 2012, pp. 96-97), in order to give them added value, to be able to evaluate and signal accurately and in advance the probability of new problematic aspects in the security plan to propose effective measures to counteract them, to diminish the impact of strategic surprises or to promote various action opportunities at strategic level. At the same time, the analytical component of the intelligence process required conceptual and operational transformations, thus becoming more than a simple and traditional stage of the intelligence cycle, including the role of interface of intelligence institutions in relation to legal beneficiaries and even civil society.



INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - FROM „DATA” TO „INFORMATION” AND „KNOWLEDGE”

Knowledge has been a concern and a necessity of man throughout his existence. The need to eliminate the uncertainty caused, inclusively, by the multitude of action possibilities offered by the information to which man has access and which can influence his conduct, imposed the need to systematize and interpret them, an activity generically called „information analysis”.

In its primary sense, analysis is a human-specific activity, an action of thought¹, hich requires a multitude of iterations², individual or cumulative, in order to clarify some of the unknowns necessary to eliminate uncertainty. In other words, analysis can also be seen as a synthesis activity³, especially when we refer to intelligence analysis, which aims to interpret in a unitary vision, by following a systematized path, a set of data or information, necessary to generate knowledge, mainly qualitative, on an issue of interest for national security.

Starting from the previous conceptual approaches, we can mention that, in the particular case of intelligence analysis, it is necessary to design and operationalize some techniques, methodologies, procedures and scientific analytical methods, to evaluate certain „sequences” of knowledge in the vast fields that characterize national security issues.⁴

In the light of this particularity, the intelligence analysis was defined as „a specialized approach to knowledge on a specific issue - that of national security - in which they are used, in specific forms and ways (...) established methods and techniques, for the purpose of formulating explanations, estimates and reasoned forecasts”. (Ioniță, 2011, p. 16). Therefore, intelligence analysis is the process by which primary data (known facts that constitute the starting point for investigating an issue with an impact on national security, without, however, being able to decipher or elucidate a specific security context), collected by specialized personnel from the informative-operative pillar, are transformed, through evaluation, completion and corroboration, explaining „the context, significance, importance and probable implications or results” (Lowenthal, 2018, p. 52), in a product that is based on informing legal beneficiaries, generically called „intelligence” (Goldfarb, 2016).

We can conclude that intelligence analysis is an intrinsic element of the intelligence process and a mandatory stage of the intelligence cycle that provides some pragmatic answers to fundamental questions (who? what? where? when? how? why?), which are likely to allow the association of primary data (which are the subject of the approach undertaken), the operational context that would provide additional knowledge value, generically called intelligence, thus resulting in products based on which strategic beneficiaries can make informed decisions (Nițu, 2012, pp. 28-29).

¹ ANALYZE vb. 1. to research, to examine, to investigate, to study, to follow, (livr.) To consider, (inv.) To meditate, to look, to count, (fig.) To explore, (inv. Fig.) to scold. (~ causes of a phenomenon.) 2. v. examine. 3. to comment, to explain, to interpret, to interpret, (inv.) To return, (fig.) To decipher. (~ a literary text.) (See: <http://www.dex.ro/analiza>. accessed: 19.05.2021.)

² “Real or mental decomposition of an object, phenomenon or of the relations between objects, phenomena, etc., into their component parts, for the purpose of knowledge; detailed examination, part by part, of a problem, of an object of study. ” (See: <http://www.dex.ro/analiza>. Accessed: 19.05.2021.)

³ SYNTHESIS, syntheses, s. F. 1. Scientific method of research of phenomena, based on the transition from the particular to the general, from the simple to the compound, in order to reach the generalization; combination of two or more elements that can form a whole. ♦ (Concr.) Work, work that addresses the essential data of a problem, of a discipline, etc. (See: <http://www.dex.ro/analiza>. Accessed: 19.05.2021.)

⁴ a.) Defense of constitutional values, Counterintelligence, Economic Security, Cross-border threats, Cybercrime, Prevention and fight against terrorism, Protection of classified information. (See: <https://sri.ro>, accessed on 19.05.2021); b.) In the fields of foreign military intelligence, combat intelligence and defense diplomacy (See Ileana, Chiriță, “General Directorate of Defense Intelligence - 15 years in the service of the national interest”, INFOSFERA Magazine, number 2/2014, pp. 27-30 .)



The presence in the public space, sometimes significant in volume, of data carried by open sources of information, which may refer, inclusively, to certain national security issues, accessible in real time even by state decision-makers, does not guarantee their veracity. There are well-known, and not numerically, situations in which some media institutions promote fake news, disseminating incomplete or biased data and information, depending on the interests of the entities that finance or control them, causing contradictory feelings on the border between panic and manipulation. For this reason, it is necessary to „identify the vulnerabilities that they (n.a.) can generate, but also to eliminate the risks, in a proactive and efficient manner” (Cernat, 2017). It is the role of intelligence analysis to provide a neutral and objective perspective on events, phenomena and situations that may affect national security/security interests, by providing beneficiaries with intelligence products that contribute to substantiating the strategic decision.

The value of the intelligence product is conferred by intrinsic characteristics such as: relevance in terms of national security; the contribution of novelty to the level of knowledge at a given time; the special character of the obtaining means; opportunity and efficiency in relation to the evolutions of the security environment (Nițu, 2012, p. 36). Such attributes of the product can only be acquired if intelligence analysis implements and applies modern scientific methods to research issues of interest in various spheres of societal life, beyond the traditional routine that is said to turn analysis into art, overcoming old prejudices too that still fuel resistance to institutional change. Statistical data processing and mathematical modeling of developments in threats and risk factors to national security, coupled with specific procedures that have traditionally characterized intelligence analysis (due to the relatively small amount of data and information that sometimes do not allow the application of previous tools listed), are likely to allow the reconceptualization of the intelligence process both in the phase of capturing/collecting information, and in the processing and dissemination to specific beneficiaries.

PECULIARITIES OF INFORMATION ANALYSIS IN MODERN INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence institutions are essential components of the institutional architecture that ensures the national security of any state entity, the analytical pillar being connected to the overall intelligence mission. From the perspective of the ways of accomplishing the mission, the intelligence analysis is carried out on a tiered structure, in specific forms, on all levels of the intelligence activity - operational, tactical and strategic (Petcu, 2011, pp. 21-28).

Operational analysis. It is well known that many of the (even recent) failures of intelligence institutions to manage security issues were not due to a lack of information about their existence, but to their inability to process and to „assemble” the fragments of information captured separately from the multitude of available sources, and, thus, to draw the overall picture of the problem. Most of the time, the information captured by various means is incomplete, highlighting only fragments of knowledge, is confusing or ambiguous and susceptible to inaccurate interpretations, including bearing the imprint of subjectivism of the source, especially if they are human or open sources. In order to become a product of intelligence, the information thus captured needs to be subjected to an initial, primary analysis - operational analysis - which consists in verifying, organizing and systematizing them, followed by issuing relevant views on the veracity, completeness or their conclusion, but also on the potential to affect the parameters of the security equation. The successive iterations, carried out by means of the previously mentioned evaluation criteria, are likely to give value to the information in its basic state, as it was collected, gaining meaning for a wider group than that of specialists in a certain field, thus becoming useful. In fact, the operational analysis involves the elaboration of evaluations „on the operative activity, supporting the operative officers in the development of specific activities (n.a.) and optimizing the information resources management process” (Handraș-Bлага, 2020). Broadly



speaking, it contributes to the „planning and execution of specific operations”, creating action opportunities, by identifying and exploiting the weaknesses and strengths of the issues analyzed (Clark, 2016, pp. 72-73). Without going through this stage, the information, no matter how important it is, remains at the stage of raw information, which cannot be interpreted and cannot subsequently acquire intelligence valences.

Tactical analysis. At the tactical level, the analysis involves the processing of national security information, produced in the operational analysis stage, which refers to sectoral issues of interest to national security such as: fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, extremist actions, affecting national heritage, counterintelligence, economic, financial, social, military issues, cross-border threats, terrorism, cybercrime, etc. Modern intelligence, characterized by the action dimension conferred by the evaluative-predictive evaluations offered to the strategic beneficiary, imposed the consolidation of the tactical analysis level that would allow the adoption of specific decisions in various fields of interest.

Strategic analysis. Modern intelligence is characterized by the development of capabilities to anticipate risks and threats to the security of any state entity, in order to maintain its role as a partner of strategic decision makers and to contribute, within the limits conferred by the action framework, to the substantiation of decisions in the state, in accordance with the general interest of society. For this, the intelligence institutions resorted to a multisectoral and multi-source approach of the phenomena that can impact the national security, giving a strategic dimension to the intelligence analysis, with a pronounced predictive-anticipatory dimension.

In the context in which history has shown that some major changes (so-called „strategic surprises”) can occur in short periods of time, and can have an impact comparable to that whose development is long-lasting which, according to the opinion of some experts (Clark, 2016, p. 70), would substantiate the strategic analysis, concluded on the need for strategic analysis designed to provide the state decision maker with information on causality, trends, possible effects and action options desirable for the decision (Kuhns, 2003, p. 96), materialized in complex evaluations and forecasts with strategic implications.

Although aimed at emphasizing the accuracy of the prediction of possible activities with a security impact, strategic analyzes cannot eliminate certain undetermined risks, which lead analysts in the field to use, as a rule, conditional language in drafting such documents. In such a circumstance, the beneficiary may be skeptical about the credibility of the intelligence product, preferring tactical level analyzes, which contain sectoral data useful in substantiating specific decisions (Topliceanu, 2017, p. 78). Although there are still such approaches, modern intelligence has focused on translating the center of gravity from tactical and operational level analyzes (oriented on „point information”) to strategic analyzes, the only ones able to provide an overview, comprehensive set of security issues that characterize the security environment.

A PORTRAIT OF THE PERFORMING ANALYST IN MODERN INTELLIGENCE

Of all the components of intelligence, the analysis has seen the deepest evolution in recent years, due to the increasingly important role played in the intelligence cycle, the development and specialization of human resources and, last but not least, the implementation of an increasingly diverse computerized tools, adapted to the transformations of the global society. It has become a proactive component, able to anticipate and meet the institutional transformations imposed by the dynamics of the security environment, being a real „catalyst” of transformations and changes in intelligence institutions (Handraș-Blaga, 2020).

In modern intelligence, the analyst is seen as an „information magician”, indispensable for the efficient capitalization of data captured by multiple sources, on which he leaves the imprint of the



professionalism of his activity, transforming them, through a complex process, previously presented, into an intelligence product that offers added value in terms of knowing the present and anticipating the future, thus providing decision-making utility (Cernat, 2017).

In order to meet these requirements, in current intelligence the analyst must cumulatively meet the following qualities:

a. A specialist in the field of analysis. At first glance, a successful analyst is one who assimilates and effectively applies, under the pressure of time (which for intelligence has become less and less), a set of specific techniques, methods and procedures (strictly methodological dimension), as formulas generally valid, regardless of the source, form and content of the data analyzed. Deepening the specifics of the field, we can conclude that it is unanimously recognized that a specialist in the field of intelligence analysis must have skills and abilities in accordance with the analytical level he serves (operational, tactical, strategic). On the other hand, he must be able to apply pragmatically and efficiently, working techniques, methods of analysis and specific procedures, in accordance with the analytical process/product he performs, in order to achieve the expected success, skillfully intertwining the rigors of scientific methodologies with intuition and imagination, which often give analysis the valences of art. Compared to the three types of analysis (operational, tactical and strategic), it is obvious that the value of intelligence products, both in terms of content but especially from an action perspective, is largely given by the professionalism of analysts on the three levels listed above, in concordance with their abilities in relation to the specifics of the activities carried out, but also with the experience gained from the relationship with the strategic beneficiary.

The issue of analysts' specialization has generated lively discussions in specialized circles, some voices supporting the need for their strict specialization (because it is individualized by different degrees of essentialization and analytical integration), including the hierarchy of their importance (in strategic-tactical-operational succession), while others highlighted the role of each type in analyzing them, as distinct and necessary activities in the intelligence cycle. Practical experience has shown, over time, that for each category of analysts it is essential their specialization, both in terms of the type of analysis and profile (dictated by national security issues), specifying the need to acquire a minimum knowledge in areas/issues related matters to be replaced in case of force majeure.

In the context of the information explosion in recent years, when the media have become, as mentioned above, true sources of information for intelligence institutions (Matei, 2010, p. 133), they had to design and operationalize their departments analysis from open source, while developing a new category of analysts specialized in investigating these sources. There are two main characteristics of this new category of analysts: on the one hand the special abilities to master the IT@C tools necessary to investigate, systematize and evaluate an impressive volume of data that are circulated mainly in the online environment, by using structured methods and modern computerized analysis and techniques, and on the other hand the overcoming of „linguistic barriers”, by knowing foreign languages (of international or even rare circulation), which would allow the investigation of data of interest from sources written in foreign languages or dialects, specific to certain geographical areas characterized by certain security threats or which may be sources of their irradiation to other regions, knowing that „the limits of knowledge of foreign languages represent the impossibility of obtaining a complete picture of national security issues” (Tecucianu, 2017).

Experts in intelligence analysis increasingly discussing, lately, against the lack of flexibility of traditional analysis tools and the multiplication of variables that characterize risks and threats of a new kind, the need to implement structured methods of analysis, based on artificial intelligence, to increase the degree of efficiency and performance. Practical experience shows that in the current activity it is not always possible to apply these methods, as there is a lack of a representative sample of data to characterize the problem (explained precisely by the specifics of activities that are limited to national



security issues), they work under time pressure, and some methods require the establishment of think-tanks from experts, which is difficult to achieve in a short period of time, imposed by the management of issues with a special impact from a security point of view. Regarding this issue, it should be noted that it is difficult to imagine the availability of strategic decision makers to make decisions with an impact on national security, based on analyzes conducted largely through IT@C tools (Lowenthal, 2018, p. 170).

Although some of the structural methods are easy to operationalize and allow examining or forecasting a problem (SWOT Analysis), they can lead to the identification and elimination of shortcomings of analytical conclusions (Devil's Advocate), allow research in the temporary dynamics of certain patterns (Trend Analysis), can highlight the elements of similarity/difference between the analyzed issues so as to issue viable hypotheses regarding the evolution of a certain phenomenon (Comparative Analysis), are recommended for the preparation of prospective products (Scenario Method), allow rationalization of the type of decision (Cost Analysis benefit), certain working procedures are often used, transposed in the form of rules, provisions, recommendations, describing in detail the ways of verification, completion, corroboration, dissemination of information to beneficiaries and feedback, allowing the initiation of new cycles of intelligence (collection - analysis - capitalization), generically known as the „internal compliance procedure” (Nițu, 2013, p. 211) or „comprehensive manual” (Handraș-Bлага, 2020).

In the practice of intelligence services there are no universally valid solutions, intelligence analysis involving the use of analytical methods, imagination, flair and intuition, but also the application of internal compliance procedures, their optimal combination leading to the success of the mission. Some specialists (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2008, pp. 55-71) opine on the need to customize the analytical tools according to the categories of information processed, as follows: for scientific or technical information especially scientific or technical expertise is recommended; military information requires the use of informative (information to know the capabilities and conception of the opponent) and scientific (description of capabilities and the form of manifestation of danger); political information („political processes, ideas and intentions of foreign countries, factions and leaders”) requires the use of methods of analysis specific to the social sciences, as in the case of information in the field of economics or social life.

b. Good expert of the managed national security issue. The success of an intelligence analyst, regardless of the institution in which he works, is conditioned by a good command of the issues of the field he manages, otherwise he cannot claim objectively the relevance of the data or information to be evaluated and processed (under the time pressure that, as a rule, an analyst does not have), and the resulting analytical products will not have the degree of concreteness and will not be able to provide the necessary level of knowledge to the beneficiary. The need presented above is all the more pressing as the issue is managed and the area of competence is more and more specialized, or modern intelligence requires this, in the context of new types of security threats in the global world.

It is well known that intelligence, especially from the perspective of the process, is a war of the mind, in which the intellectual capabilities of human resources are the main weapon of the institution, on an invisible front, increasingly professional and adapted to the specifics of new threats, in counterbalancing traditional military threats (in this context, military intelligence has the task of warning military and politico-military decision-makers about risk factors and threats to state security), but without ultimately marginalizing them. Moreover, intelligence manifests itself „in a political arena not in an abstract intellectual salon” (Lowenthal, 2018, p. 60), which makes its mission increasingly difficult.

The translation, in recent years, of more and more activities in the virtual space, has been accompanied by the exponential multiplication of cyber attacks on critical state infrastructures, the



damage being almost immeasurable. In this context, intelligence institutions have developed cyberintelligence structures necessary to ensure cyber security, where the analysis activity requires, first of all, „explication”, both for itself but especially for the beneficiaries of analytical products, a specialized terminology, and then providing its own tools necessary for the production and provision of information necessary for the management of cyber attacks by the competent institutions. If we were to refer to the series of classic questions to which information must be answered (which we presented in a previous chapter), we could say, without fear of error, that cyberintelligence is the field of national security in which the answers to the questions „What?” and How?” are the most difficult to formulate in the absence of a rich baggage of knowledge in the field. Moreover, the detection, deepening, verification and completion of information on cyber threats is a special exercise for the intelligence analyst, even if he has the opportunity to collaborate with specialists in the information-operational or technical areas.

Counterintelligence, foreign intelligence (including military) or defence diplomacy are issues of national security in which the analyst does not „escape” the imperative of specialization, each with its own particularities whose identification and countermeasure is equivalent to a „game” of intelligence. An intelligence analyst must have good knowledge of both the issues of the services of opposing entities (residences, topics, modus operandi), knowing that their target is, on the one hand, the person with „access to information of interest” or which may influence „politico-military, technological or economic decisions” (SRI, n.d.), and on the other hand certain evolutions in time of some events at international / regional level or of certain technological, cultural or economic relations, politico-military, including the military potential of other states (Hapau, 2014, pp. 21-22).

In the field of preventing and combating terrorism or managing the issue of illegal migration, the specialization of the intelligence analyst is more than necessary, if we refer to the fact that both phenomena have found a suitable ground to appear in regions of the world where the domination of authoritarian-totalitarian regimes, undemocratic and underperforming governments, shortcomings in economic development, major gaps between poor and rich or radical militancy fueled by the harmful mixture of politics and religion. Knowledge in the field of criminology, history, legal sciences, diplomacy, psychology, religion, sociology, etc. is needed to be able to explain the causes, motivations, operation and typology of the actors involved, in a multidisciplinary interpretation to ensure optimal knowledge of the mentioned issues and their security effects (Peptan, 2020a, pp. 13 & 99). The need for specialization of the intelligence analyst is also determined by the fact that the success of the fight against the terrorist phenomenon or illegal migration is the operationalization of partnerships, domestic and international cooperation, in which the analytical component has an essential role.

One of the areas of exceptional importance for national security, especially in the context of the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, is Economic Security, where the intelligence analyst must master the terminology, legislation and mechanisms to detect and highlight the risks and threats associated with issues caused by: the influences of globalization on the national economy, the major gap of modern technologies compared to developed countries, the loss of traditional markets for domestic products, increasing the level of external lending, harming national interests in certain strategic sectors, promoting unrealistic economic policies, deficiencies in the absorption of European funds, increasing the level of tax evasion, etc. (Peptan, 2020b, pp. 116-133).

Last but not least, in an exhaustive enumeration, the issue of Defending Constitutional Values or the one managed by the General Directorate of Domestic Protection (specialized structure within the Ministry of Internal Affairs) requires the professionalization of the analytical component, given their specificities and importance in ensuring the stability of the internal security equation. A good intelligence analyst must master the entire „arsenal” of knowledge related to the fields of legal and



socio-humanities in order to be able to formulate pertinent assessments regarding the security risks and threats specific to the fields in question.⁵

Starting from the particularities of each field of national security, previously referred to, it can be stated that specialization in a certain field/issue does not ensure, implicitly, the success in the entire range of analytical activities specific to intelligence institutions. It is well known that the specialization and professionalization of the „guild” of intelligence analysts is done in (much) time, and maintaining them at a higher level of performance necessarily requires, without distinguishing between experienced or beginners, a permanent documentation to ensure their connection to the latest developments, both of the global security issues and of those specific to their areas of competence, taking into account the dynamism of the security environment. In this context, the interaction with specialists from the external environment, with those in the area of information gathering, with other more efficient analytical structures, is an essential element for achieving performance. It is obtained when the intelligence analyst is a good specialist in the issues he manages (without claiming to be the holder of the absolute truth), is aware of the limits of knowledge, is concerned about the latest developments in societal life that have a security impact (but especially in the field in which he works) and is enthusiastic, concerned and interested in new details or nuances that can give a different vision to the overall image that he has designed based on the elements of knowledge acquired so far (Moldovan & Chelariuc, 2017).

c. A specialist in social communication. As previously highlighted, intelligence analysts are specialists who produce information documents that are communicated to beneficiaries/decision makers, but also those who receive and evaluate their reactions and then formulate requirements that lead to new elements of knowledge for state decision makers. In general, they must provide „integrated intelligence services, which means expertise, resources and products” (Petraș, 2014), contributing substantially to the assumed mission. It can be said that this activity is specific to the field of social communication, especially at the strategic level, and has the purpose of self-regulation and self-organization of the entire intelligence activity, through feedback processes (adaptation of activities in accordance with the purpose, by measures that lead to its realization) or feed-forward (the way of anticipating/predicting the evolution of the interaction between the issuer and the decision maker to achieve the proposed goal) (Vlăduțescu, 2002, pp. 57-58).

The intelligence analyst has an essential role in framing information, by organizing meanings and assigning their meaning, by interpreting data captured in various ways available to intelligence institutions. In fact, the analyst aims to send a message to the strategic decision maker, through a code that includes syntactic and lexical selections (Chevereșan & Pădurean, 2010) related to a national security issue.

The relevance of the data subject to the information documents for the beneficiaries (although it is an essential requirement of intelligence) is not sufficient to determine them to take the necessary legal measures to remove the security issues reported. The busy schedule, lack of availability in some cases, preconceived notions and minimization of the importance of intelligence institutions, or the mistaken impression that the data provided can be accessed directly from open sources, sometimes lead to failure to pay due attention to interaction with intelligence institutions (in particular, the content of information documents). Although the procedures related to the process of informing the beneficiaries aim to increase their degree of responsibility, including the „introducing of a section dedicated to expressing needs or comments” (Nițu, 2012, p. 239), they do not guarantee adequate

⁵ Affecting the rights and freedoms of citizens, extremist actions with an impact on national security, preserving identity values (See <https://www.sri.ro/apararea-valorilor-constitutionale>, accessed: 22.05.2021). Management and protection of the patrimonial interests, of the personnel, of the missions, of the decision-making process, of the operational and informational capacities of the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. (See <https://dgpi.ro>, accessed: 22.05.2021).



behavior, respectively the adoption of those legal measures that would lead to the achievement of the goal of intelligence.

In order to arouse the beneficiary's interest and determine him, subsequently, to adopt an active behavior, the intelligence product must be written and promoted according to marketing principles, because both the product and the communication approach that aims to generate the reaction are cognitively constructive processes. The intelligence product arouses interest primarily through the title; without causing a sensation, it must be carefully chosen, have an impact and clearly highlight the issue of national security addressed. As the reader's attention (even the strategic beneficiary) is progressively diluted during the reading, it is advisable to essentialize the message and highlight the problematic issues of a security nature in the first part of the information document. The expression must be logical, short, concise and to the point, the ideas well argued, the message must be well articulated, given the fact that the addressee (strategic decision maker) is usually in an acute crisis of time and the issue of relationship with intelligence institutions, although important, is not its main task (Petraș, 2014). Of paramount importance is the non-insertion of errors that may affect the form or substance of the information document, such as: misrepresentation of information, incorrect assessment of threats, exceeding competencies, confusion, use of often used expressions (Ene, 2011, p. 83). It should be noted that, often, the beneficiaries of intelligence products do not master the specific language, even if there are concerns regarding the drafting of a „glossary of estimates” to facilitate the correct understanding of the meaning of language (Lowenthal, 2018, p. 59).

Last but not least, it is imperative that when writing an information document, the analyst has an impeccable expression and spelling because possible errors reduce the value of the analytical product and can generate indirect, unforeseen effects: „a wrong word used can have the opposite effect to the expected one; an improper, vague, incorrect expression induces ambiguities; an extra word betrays partisan position; a word minus makes the analysis incomplete; the use of neologisms and jargon makes it difficult to understand” (Fânculescu, 2011, p. 81). If the intelligence analyst also has a native talent in writing, an aspect that can be modeled but not created, the success of his approach is much closer to being achieved.

In conclusion, the quality of an intelligence product and its interest for the beneficiary is determined, on the one hand by the importance and relevance of the processed data/information, and on the other hand by the analyst's ability to highlight and emphasize the degree of danger of risks, threats or dangers to societal security (including situations where they appear to be meaningless at first sight), in a coherent expression, without conveying an inaccurate or insufficiently sustained message, in which case the whole information process could be compromised. Using this arsenal of knowledge and skills, through a logical argument, detached from the emotional load of the analyzed aspects and any partisan attitude, the intelligence analyst will give birth to a product / information document that will generate rational and lucid judgment of the beneficiary and it will guide him towards an actionable conduct, in accordance with the attributions conferred by the position held, subsequent to the issue of national security.

d. A professional with clear ethical and deontological principles. Although, often, the relations between the intelligence institutions and the legal beneficiaries are characterized by different visions and opinions, springing precisely from the cultures that characterize them, in order to fulfill the purpose with which they were endowed (intelligence case) and the attributions/responsibilities towards citizens (the case of the beneficiaries), they must show mutual trust, show availability in the relationship and, last but not least, respect the confidentiality of the relationship between the parties. It is imperative that intelligence activity in general and analytical activity in particular be governed by the application of ethical principles such as truth, accuracy, precision and objectivity, because the very ethics of information analysis requires „assuming process accuracy, product comprehensibility, the



benevolence of intentions” (Bizadea, 2013), and the activity of the intelligence analyst to be marked by some behavioral conduct that will be treated in the following lines (Răduțu, 2011, pp. 43-45).

For this, first of all, the activity of the intelligence analyst must bear the imprint of the importance and responsibility of the activity carried out, precisely due to the role played in what we generically call „achieving national security”, as part of the institutional architecture empowered to achieve this goal. Starting from the implications that can be determined at societal level the intelligence products that are the object of informing the legal beneficiaries (assumed indirectly by intelligence with their production), it is necessary for the analyst to evaluate responsibly the analyzed information and to present impartially the situation highlighted by them, without preconceived opinions and/or external influences, especially that under the pressure of some objective or subjective factors can appear at any time the unintentional and unconscious error that would give rise to ethical problems (Răduțu, 2011, pp. 43-45).

In other words, the analyst must be aware of his degree of expertise, a context in which it is important to realistically self-assess his own limits of knowledge of the issues under management. A professional analyst must have the expertise to identify „connections and patterns” in the multitude of data processed, in other words he is doomed to "know everything", but until he reaches this level of knowledge he must be aware of the limits of his own knowledge and to be constantly concerned with exceeding these limits. By doing so, the intelligence product will encompass not only what the analyst knows, but also what he does not know exactly and „what are the uncertainties”, so that the strategic beneficiary „appreciates the extent of the remaining uncertainties” and that they are not ignored or masked” (Lowenthal, 2018, p. 69).

The analyst must be objective, but tenaciously support his assessments. The issue of the objectivity of the intelligence analyst, and of the analysis as a whole, has generated extensive discussions among specialists and beneficiaries of intelligence products. Starting from the imperative of the need for objectivity, but also from the impact of endogenous factors on the actual analysis activity and not, last but not least, from the subjectivism inherent in the human factor, often assumed, the activity of the intelligence analyst must materialize in products with an anticipatory-predictive character, even in the form of alternative scenarios requested by the beneficiaries. Convinced of the correctness of the expressed views, following the scientific processing of the processed information, but also of intuition, flair and professionalism, the intelligence analyst will tenaciously support the results of the analytical approach detached from his own prejudices, but accepting other relevant points of view that can add value to it.

The analyst must be creative, intuitive and innovative in order to overcome the conformity of action patterns and heuristic prejudices that have long kept the activity of intelligence and analysis institutions in particular in a „perpetuated” structure. Creativity and innovation mean a pro-active attitude, imposed even by the evolutions of the security environment, likely to give a different interpretation to the traditional approaches of the tools used in intelligence analysis. In the analyst's work, creativity, intuition and the spirit of innovation must be found in all subsequent stages (verification, confirmation, completion, interpretation, dissemination) and in all its forms (operational, tactical, strategic), as a way of adapting to circumstances, all the more so as these attributes are specific to human intelligence and must be removed from the „shadow cone” in which modernism translated them by cultivating rational thinking “seen as a guarantor of truth and trust” (Galea, 2020).

CONCLUSIONS

Intelligence analysis is a decisive stage in the cycle of intelligence activities, which adds value to information collected in a raw form by specialized personnel, so as to ensure, before knowledge,



prevention and counteraction, the anticipation of threats and risks of security, the anticipatory-preventive dimension becoming a priority for any intelligence institution.

Major global events that have had a major security impact such as the terrorist attacks of the last two decades, starting on 9/11 and ending with those in Europe in recent years, the wave of illegal migration to Western Europe, or the COVID pandemic 19, confirmed a well-known fact, with roots in the history of the last century, debated by the literature (Ardusatan, 2013): although intelligence institutions had clues that predicted the events, they showed serious deficiencies in evaluation, corroboration and capitalization in due course, for at least debatable reasons.

Based on the previous explanations, intelligence institutions have adopted measures to reconceptualize specific activities, including in the field of intelligence analysis. These approaches are circumscribed by the natural concerns of overcoming the state of confusion in which many of the world's states (including intelligence institutions) find themselves, which is determined by the interested actions of vectors that threaten national or global security interests, even by launching a whole arsenal of prefabricated information in the public space. In such a circumstance, the intelligence analyst is the one who „stops only at that information relevant to national security” and transforms it through specific activities „into accurate knowledge, relevant and usable in terms of national security” that are made available to the strategic decision maker (Moldovan & Cheleriuc, 2017).

Overcoming the stereotypes that have long made the field of intelligence analysis to be considered the „ash” of intelligence, it has, today, an essential role in the institutional architecture, starting from the level of operational analysis (evaluation, verification, corroboration of primary data) to the strategic one (production of evaluations and forecasts that substantiate strategic decisions), including the dimension of inter-institutional cooperation and relations with strategic beneficiaries, an issue that has seen a new approach in modern intelligence.

In order to formulate answers to the real problems of society, from a security perspective, by interpreting issues that are not always novel, the field of intelligence analysis requires refined working tools and staff specialization, according to the developments imposed by the processes associated with the phenomenon of globalization and even by the globalization of security threats. In this context, the analyst must be a specialist, both in the field of analysis and in the (inter) national security issues he manages. Knowledge and application of methods and techniques of analysis (modernist or sometimes conservative) are fundamental requirements for a successful intelligence analyst, but what gives him recognition is the art of being a good communicator, doubled by awareness and responsibility he has, however, related to the mandatory ethical and deontological dimension in such a sensitive and important approach, namely that of achieving national security.

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